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Abstract
This thesis sheds light on the meaning and usefulness of the concept of "Public 
Diplomacy". Although some would question its utility as a concept, Public Diplomacy 
has entered the lexicon of the American and British Foreign Policy in the post 9-11 
terrorist events. Public Diplomacy, incorporated into Foreign Policy, revolves around 
methods for State and non-State representatives to qualify as a voice for their country 
to the outside world. The thesis also traces the Public Diplomacy failures of the 
Palestinian leadership during and after the negotiations at Camp David II and it 
highlights the successes achieved at The Hague, when the International Court of 
Justice made it clear that the Israeli Wall and settlements were illegal.
While Neo-Realism is essential in understanding a State's policy to adopt a strong 
Public Diplomacy as a national objective and interest, it is not sufficient to explain the 
mechanisms and actors involved in this newly introduced concept. With its emphasis 
on institutions and non-state actors, Institutionalism provides a better understanding 
and a comprehensive picture of the functioning of Public Diplomacy.  
 dna evitceffe na fo noitatnemelpmi rof snoitadnemmocer htiw sedulcnoc siseht ehT
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الملخص
 هذه الدراسة تلقي الضوء على معنى وأهمية  مبدأ الـ "الدبلوماسية العامة". رغم أن البعض
 قد يشكك في أهمية هذا المبدأ، إل أنه دخل لغة السياسة الخارجية للوليات المتحدة المريكية
 . إن1002 أيلول 9ولبريطانيا خلل المرحلة ما بعد العمليات الرهابية التي وقعت في 
 الدبلوماسية العامة، المندمحة في السياسة الخارجية، تتمحور حول الساليب المستعملة لكل من
 ممثلي الدولة وممثلي المنظمات غير الحكومية للتأهيل ليصبحوا صوتا لدولهم عند العالم
 الخارجي. وتتناول الدراسة أيضا فشل القيادة الفلسطينية في الدبلوماسية العامة خلل وبعد
 ، كما ستدخل الدراسة في النتصار الذي تم تحقيقه في محكمة العدل2مفاوضات كامب ديفيد 
الدولية والتي أكدت بوضوح على عدم شرعية الجدار والمستوطنات التي تبنيها إسرائيل.
 بينما تعتبر المدرسة الواقعية أساسا لفهم سياسة الدولة لتطبيق الدبلوماسية العامة كهدف
ومصلحة وطنية، إل أنها ليست كافية لشرح الساليب و
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Introduction
Focus of Study
Many scholars are focusing on the importance of American and British Public 
Diplomacy (PD) in the Arab World in order to improve their stand with the current 
"War on Terrorism."1 However, Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular have 
not given importance to such an important field in order to improve their image in 
the West and to harness the power of their people to project a modern image: 
"Any people should seek to be a subject of history and not only an 
object of history. Making history is extremely important… explaining 
history and disseminating one's version of history is of equal 
importance. We have not given this dimension sufficient attention-
irrigating our narrative, our version, our interpretation of history."2
Stemming from this reality of Palestinian diplomatic inactivity, accurately advanced 
by Palestinian PLO Representative in Washington Afif Safieh, Palestinians have not 
been able to articulate a positive image of their case that enhances their legitimate 
rights in self determination. 
1  see for example William A. Rugh's "Engaging the Arab & Islamic Worlds through Public 
Diplomacy", Public Diplomacy Council , 2004;  Mark Leonard's "Public Diplomacy", Foreign Policy 
Center, 2002; Tuch's "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY , 1990 
2 "The Anatomy of the PLO Mission: Recapturing the Historical Initiative", transcripts of remarks by 
Amb Afif Safieh, The Palestine Center, Washington, D.C. for the record no. 240 (2 December 2005)
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the US underscore an urgent need for more effective 
and institutional Palestinian PD. As Safieh puts it when referring to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization: "only a few thousands may work in the institution, but the 
nine million Palestinians are the powerful vehicles of the idea."3 Governmental 
agencies should reach out to the societal actors because PD is a multi-dimensional 
and inclusive process. 
Given the escalating negative attitudes towards the Palestinians, the effects of PD 
decisions and implementations should be of primary considerations in the 
Palestinian foreign policy. In fact, a Herculean effort is needed to challenge Israel 
diplomatically and confront their territorial appetite and enterprise based on 
demographic pretexts. This effort should be a collective one, involving 
actors/credible messengers from diverse sectors of the Palestinian scene. 
Taking Sharon's disengagement, the Palestinians lost another historical narrative, 
since the world believed Sharon's disengagement from the Gaza Strip is a first move 
in implementing peace. There is no spokesperson to articulate the Palestinian history 
of dispossession and to propagate their narrative. 
Aspects of Research
3 "The Anatomy of the PLO Mission: Recapturing the Historical Initiative", transcripts of remarks by 
Amb Afif Safieh, The Palestine Center, Washington, D.C. for the record no. 240 (2 December 2005)
2
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This thesis will start with a definitional debate on PD. Why is it important to rectify 
the image of Palestinians in the West in the post 9/11 and how can a professional 
and most of all sustainable PD serve such an objective will be covered in Chapter 
one.  This first chapter will provide a working definition for PD that would serve as 
a framework to the rest of the thesis. Two schools of thought will be used to help us 
understand the functioning of PD. The two theories will be engaged to better grasp 
the concept in International Relations: Neo-Realism and Institutionalism. Of 
particular interest is the finding that both schools are associated and complementary 
in the understanding of PD. The latter is conducted by the government for its 
national interests (a pillar of Neo-Realism) while simultaneously focusing on 
international institutions (argument of Institutionalists). The two schools will 
therefore offer an explanation and an operational meaning and significance of PD. 
Because the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian land continues unabated with all its 
racist forms, it is overwhelmingly in the national interest that Palestine formulates 
and manages its foreign policies in a manner that it receives the required world 
cooperation/support. On the same note, Palestine needs to conduct its PD through a 
strong coordination with the various local and international institutions. In a 
nutshell, the purpose of PD is to influence opinion in target countries to make it 
easier for a government to achieve their aims. 
Chapter two explores how the Palestinian Authority failed in PD during the period 
starting from Camp David II until the eruption of Al Aqsa Intifada. The "generous 
offer" of Barak is a term widely used internationally; it exemplifies the dismal state 
3
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of Palestinian PD. After the trilateral negotiations of Camp David, Palestinians, 
unlike Israelis, failed to work on a coherent strategy and expose their case through 
repetitive projects, tours and conferences and regular contacts with world decision 
makers (both official and non official). A number of recommendations will be 
drawn from past mistakes, among which are that there need to be a consistent 
Palestinian message on major issues in order to project the Palestinian case, a clear 
official line on major issues, and policy making think tanks to research and produce 
essential policy papers on issues and events as they arise. 
In the chapter that follows, Chapter three, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
ruling against the construction of Israel's wall, will be raised.  The unequivocal ICJ 
ruling considering the wall being built by Israel as "contrary to international law" 
lends strong legal and moral support to international efforts to end the Israeli 
occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Again, despite the Palestinian PD 
victory at the ICJ, there is an urgent need to rely on the ruling for a successful and 
efficient Palestinian PD. This will be tackled in detail at the end of the last chapter. 
The final recommendations to the Palestinian leadership (Palestinian Authority (PA) 
/Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)) revolve around two main elements of PD: 
to work on a vision and to ponder an effective strategy accompanied by an effectual 
structure based on proactive and even aggressive advocacy campaigns to rival 
Israel's sophisticated Public Relations efforts. Israel has succeeded in reframing the 
conflict based on "security" and the need for "self defense", while portraying the 
Palestinians as being "terrorists". Palestinians should reverse the table and work on 
4
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instruments to control the parameters of the game. Unfortunately, Palestinians have 
only been answering Israel's reframing, sometimes even late (Camp David failure, 
disengagement, etc…). In fact, Palestinian PD is retroactive. The Palestinian 
leadership waits for a crisis to come up to start working on its position. It is essential 
to explain the Palestinian position during the non-crisis moments, rare as they are, in 
order to capture the world attention. Other key recommendations to the Palestinian 
leadership is the issuance of a presidential directive establishing a priority 
commitment to PD, the creation of a coordinating structure, aimed at harmonizing 
PD efforts of all Palestinian actors (governmental agencies, private sector, civil 
society organizations and Palestinian expatriates), and increased training, resources, 
as well as up-to-date technology to all governmental and non governmental officials. 
Significance of Research 
Many scholars sought to tackle the Palestinians' dilemma and the lack of bargaining 
power when faced to Israel's art in political propaganda. Many have also agreed that 
there is a privileged Western Israeli relationship.4 The major conclusions reached 
were that Palestinians need to work on a unified message that could lend them world 
support5. 
4  Camille Mansour, "Beyond Alliance, Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy", Institute for Palestine Studies, 
Columbia University Press, NY, 1994
5  see for example Michael Adams "What Went Wrong in Palestine?", Journal of Palestine Studies, 
Vol. 18, No.1, Special Issue Palestine 1948, Autumn 1988; or Kathleen Christison, "Perceptions of 
Palestine", University of California Press, 1999
5
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But this is not enough. In order to reach out to the international community, a 
concerted strategy for a sustainable Palestinian Public Diplomacy to forge an 
effective international lobbying force is needed. As a new concept, Palestinian 
Public Diplomacy needs to be applied and to adapt to the XXI Century demands in 
terms of information technology. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to present 
recommendations with new structures for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Palestinian leadership.
The second aspect of novelty in this research is that it goes beyond having a unified 
message; i.e. it heralds the importance of a long-term and sustained Palestinian 
Public Diplomacy as a national strategy, not only to win the current information 
battle with Israel, but to constantly reach mass audiences and respond to the rapidly 
changing international landscape. 
Furthermore, as the ICJ ruling on the Wall is a relatively new event, few researchers 
have discussed in details the importance of diplomatically utilizing such a success in 
order to foster favorable attitudes toward the Palestinian cause. 
Main Research Questions 
This thesis seeks to address the following questions:
6
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 What is "Public Diplomacy"?
 How does Public Diplomacy operate?
 What are the reasons behind the Palestinian diplomatic 
inactivity?
 Why is a Palestinian Public Diplomacy needed along with the 
traditional diplomatic approach?
 How and where to start from to embark on an efficient 
Palestinian Public Diplomacy?
Methodology and Work Plan 
The thesis will be outlined in three main sections:
1) a theoretical section that outlines two different theories that could 
address the subject;
2) a historical section that relates to the failed Camp David negotiations, 
highlighting the Palestinian misuse of the media which reported the Israeli 
narrative;
3) a section on the post-International Court of Justice Ruling on the 
Wall being built by Israel, as a case study on how to utilize the ruling by 
using an effective Public Diplomacy approach. 
Resources 
7
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In this research, two categories of resources will be used: primary and secondary 
ones. 
Primary resources in the form of diaries by Public Diplomacy practitioners will be 
used to understand the meaning of this new concept. Official statistics, UN 
resolutions, International Court of Justice documents, and speeches of some leaders 
will also be employed as primary sources to tackle the usefulness and functioning of 
Public Diplomacy in addressing its various facets.
Secondary sources will include academic and/or analytical researches to understand 
different accounts on the Palestinian case.  
Chapter one: Public Diplomacy (PD), a definitional debate
8
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1.1. Introduction
Although the term "Public Diplomacy" was first used in 1965 by Dean Edmund 
Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University6, it has 
become at the forefront of an important transition in International Relations, the rise 
of "soft power"7 in a field long dominated by "realpolitik". The main outcomes of 
today's new world order reside in the information and technological revolution, as 
well as new calls for democratization.8 In fact, scholars who have previously focused 
on ensuring military power, have now added good governance and democracy to 
their theories and programs.9 Today's information technology revolution greatly 
affects political communication. While debates are currently underway on PD in the 
US, as in many other countries, emphasis should be initially put on a basic and 
workable definition or a common denominator on the concept. A clear-cut 
understanding of what PD stands for would lead to building relevant 
recommendations and strategies for a functional Palestinian PD.  
1.2. Public Diplomacy Vs. "Traditional" Diplomacy 
6  Library of Congress Study of US International and Cultural Programs Activities, 
www.publicdiplomacy.com 
7  "Soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your 
goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrot and sticks of economic and military 
might to make others follow your will". Joseph Jr. Nye, "Propaganda isn’t the way", Editorial. The 
International Herald Tribune, 10 January 2003 
8  Dr. Samir Amin, "The National State and Obstacles of Globalisation in the Arab World", Afro 
Arab Research Center Cairo, Strategic Research and Studies Center, Damascus, 2004
9  Charles T. Call & Susan E. Cook, "Global Governance, a Review of Multilateralism and 
International Organizations", Lynne Rienners, Vol. 9, No.2., April-June 2003 
9
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Diplomacy, in its multilayered meaning, is a formulation and implementation of 
foreign politics, international negotiations and professional activity, all performed 
by diplomats.10 One can simply define Diplomacy as a primary method with which 
foreign policy is realized. Foreign Policy is a formulation and a direction, and 
Diplomacy is a communication and a realization.11 Diplomacy is responsible for 
managing the relations between countries and ensuring specific and wide interests.12 
How can we then locate the concept of PD? Signitzer and Coombs view PD as "…a 
way, with which the government and the private individuals and groups can directly 
or indirectly influence those public opinions and positions, which directly influence 
the foreign politics decisions of another government."13 The US Information Agency 
(USAI) offers the following definition for Public Diplomacy: Public Diplomacy 
means: "To understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in the promotion of 
the national interest and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and US 
institutions and their counterparts abroad."14
Within such understanding, PD is widening its field of traditional diplomatic 
activities: from the closed sphere of governments and diplomats on new actors and 
target groups; i.e. individuals, groups and organizations that are joining international 
10  Harold Nicholson, "Diplomacy", Washington, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown 
University, 1988) 
11  William C. Olson, "The Theory and Practice of International Relations", NJ, Prentice Hall, 1991
12  R.P. Barston, "Modern Diplomacy", London, NY, Longman, 1988
13  Benno H. Signitzer and Timothy Coombs, "Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual 
Convergences", PR Review 8, 1992 
14  Pam Smith, Minster Counselor for Public Affairs, US Embassy, London 
10
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and intercultural communications activities and that have influence on the political 
relations between countries. Similarly, Hans N. Tuch defines PD as "a government's 
process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about 
understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as 
its national goals and current policies."15 
These definitions entail that PD is mainly a state sponsored program designed to 
inform and/or influence public opinion in other countries. It concentrates on official 
government's efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in which 
foreign policy is played out with a view to reducing misperceptions and 
misunderstandings about one's country. 
"PD differs from traditional Diplomacy in that it involves interactions not only with 
governments but primarily with non-governmental individuals and organizations.16 
As elaborated also by Tuch, PD presupposes an open communication process, which 
is based on the principle of publicity and is trying to speak to the public, as opposed 
to the traditional diplomacy, characterized by secrecy and exclusivity.17 Gilboa also 
describes PD in the sense of content as activities in the field of informing and 
educating, as a guide to foreign countries with a purpose of influencing foreign 
governments through influencing their citizens.18 
15  Hans N. Tuch "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY, 1990
16  Edward Murrow, 1963, speaking as Director of USIA, quoted in Mark Leonard, "Public 
Diplomacy", Foreign Policy Center, 2002 
17  Hans N. Tuch "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY, 1990
18  Eytan Gilboa, "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects", 2001 
11
Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
Furthermore, traditional Diplomacy is often characterized by confidentiality; 
whereas publicity is the inherent purpose of PD.19 
Most of the authors who wrote in this field have therefore agreed on the desired 
effects of diverse activities of PD intended to make the transmitted messages being 
heard, accepted and understood, and to create and consolidate a positive image, a 
good reputation and a favorable international position of one's home country. PD 
can therefore be defined as different forms of convincing communications with 
foreign publics in the context of fulfilling the goals of foreign politics. It also 
suggests tools of feeding off the general image of a country – for example, Norway's 
reputation for international mediation helped persuade conflict areas that Norway is 
an honest broker. PD also provides methods for lobbyists to shape public opinion 
around the world. While traditional diplomacy is the management of relations 
between countries, engaging one government with another government; PD, 
however, moves away from the center of government out into society.  It includes 
interaction not only with the government but also with individuals and non 
governmental organizations. In fact, in our context of communications technology, 
Foreign Affairs is no longer the preserve of a few governmental élites - it has 
become increasingly shared by Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
businesses and other non-state actors. When a Palestinian student conducts a 
research or attends a training at Amideast or any US information center in 
Jerusalem, Ramallah or Gaza, he or she is using a service provided by US public 
diplomats. When Birzeit University offers the Palestine Arab Studies (PAS) 
19  Hans N. Tuch "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY, 1990
12
Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
program to teach Arabic language to foreigners, Palestinian PD is operating. When a 
French artist is on a tour in Palestine, this is PD. These are but a few of the wide 
scope of activities involved in PD. It can therefore be employed either by the State 
or by non-state actors. The latter are more and more taking the lead over or 
complementing states' performance.  PD is viewed as a state sponsored program 
notwithstanding engaging non state actors in other countries. 
1.3. Public Diplomacy Vs. Propaganda
The Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary (1990) offers the following 
definition for "propaganda": It is "information, frequently exaggerated or false 
information, which is spread by political groups in order to influence the public". 
The aim of PD and Propaganda is similar: it is to win people over to a given set of 
ideas. However, propaganda means information based on falsehoods and untruths. 
PD does not have such negative connotation – it should be based on known fact; 
otherwise, the reliability of information would be questioned. As Edward R. Murrow 
puts it: "…to be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be 
credible; to be credible we must be truthful…" 20  It is a fact that PD does not only 
consist of informing with the aim of transmitting objective information, but is rather 
mainly defined by its intentional persuasion. The latter means that the messenger is 
trying to influence the public to accept proposed positions and behavior. Tuch 
20  Edward R. Murrow is Director of USIA, May 1963 www.publicdiplomacy.com 
13
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argues that propaganda would be the appropriate term if used in its original 
meaning, and not burdened with discomfort and negative connotations. 
On the other hand, the proliferation of information in societies hampers the 
government's control of information: this means that governmental attempts to 
distort the reality will immediately be exposed, leading to skepticism of 
governmental claims. In fact, ideas that people get about a country are beyond 
governmental control because of the fundamental role played by the media, books, 
CDs, etc… in spreading information. Simultaneously, the government's role in 
promoting PD should be to facilitate the transmission of positive images and 
messages about the country. More precisely, the President gives directives on 
Diplomatic and Foreign Policy issues.  Taking the American model, PD and 
inextricably Foreign Policy are conducted by the President. The latter is the central 
and key figure in Foreign Policy. The role of parties is taken into consideration; 
however, the President is preeminent in the domain of Foreign Policy, because 
he/she places national interests ahead of party interests.21 The government's role in 
PD can also be directed at the academic level: the US PD Council is a good case in 
point – it serves as a resource for the teaching, training, and development of PD as 
an academic discipline. 22 
1.4. Is Public Diplomacy Soft Power?
21  John W. Spanier, Eric M. Uslaner, "American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic 
Dilemmas", Macmillan Publishing Company, NY, Maxwell Macmillan, Canada, Sixth Edition, 1994
22  "Engaging the Arab & Islamic Worlds through Public Diplomacy", William A. Rugh, Public 
Diplomacy Council, 2004
14
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Broadly speaking, "Power" lies in the capacity to do things; i.e. the ability to get the 
outcomes one wants. But Power is also the ability to affect behaviors of others to 
achieve those things. "So more specifically, power is the ability to influence the 
behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. But there are several ways to 
affect the behavior of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce 
them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want." 23
Joseph Nye coined the term “Soft Power” (SP) in the late 1980ies. SP lies in the 
ability to attract, persuade, and shape the preferences of others24; on the other hand, 
Hard Power is the use of military or economic might of a country. Hard Power 
remains important in a world of states trying to guard their independence and of 
non-state groups willing to turn to armed resistance. The current Palestinian 
conundrum lies in the fact that military resistance groups focus heavily on military 
power to force Israel do the Palestinian will; while the Palestinian leadership pays 
too little heed to Public Diplomacy or SP 
SP is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and 
policies. When our policies are seen legitimate in the eyes of others, our SP is 
enhanced.” 25 
23   Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004 
Public Affairs New York
24 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004 Public 
Affairs New York
25 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004 Public 
Affairs New York
15
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SP is an important reality, recognized even by the British realist, E.H. Carr who 
described power as having a trilateral significance: military, economic and power 
over opinion. 26 According to Nye, a country may have hard power (i.e. economic 
and military might as a way to establish empires and institutions); however its SP 
could decline if brutal policies are used to achieve its objectives. Nye also argues 
that hard power tools are not sufficient to achieve national interests. He even goes 
far to say that a country could enjoy political clout even if its military and economic 
weight are diminished. Norway and Switzerland are a good case in point. Bernard 
Bot further explains the necessity for Europe to exercise military power and make it 
consonant with soft diplomatic power to gain Arab support in the aftermath of the 
American invasion of Iraq.27 This bears witness to the validity of the concept of SF.
Mark Leonard argues that there are three dimensions of PD that governments should 
pursue in order to engage people in one's cause and convince politicians to take 
one's stand. These three dimensions happen to coincide with three characteristics of 
Soft Power, advanced by Joseph Nye:
1. News Management: 
26  E.H. Carr, "The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the
         Study of International Relations". 1939London: Macmilan
27  Bernard Bot, "Europe Must Exercise Both Soft and Hard Power", European Affairs, Spring 2004, 
Volume 5, No. 2
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Plugged into the government machine, news is the management of communication 
on day-to-day issues. Governments should react to news events as they occur in a 
way that tallies with the strategic goals. It is necessary to contextualize stories in the 
news coverage. In this regard, Israel has enormously succeeded. In June 2005, 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon reiterated Israel's intention to build 3,500 
additional units of housing for Jewish settlers in the Palestinian West Bank while 
demanding at the same time that the Palestinian leadership do more to dismantle 
what the Israeli leader refers to as the "terror infrastructure." When the term, 
"infrastructure of terror" is employed by Sharon in different media outlets, it is not 
only an emotionally charged metaphor, but it also suggests that the only obstruction 
to peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is the "infrastructure of terror". 
When invoked by Israel, this strong slogan empties the conflict of all references to 
the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territory, despite his open intentions of 
illegally constructing new settlements. Unlike the Israeli imposed narrative, 
Palestinians have not produced any charged terms to expose their cause and 
challenge the Israeli  accounts. Not only the Palestinian terminology has been 
absent, but the use of weapons by Palestinians in supposedly peaceful marches is a 
scene highly portrayed in the various international media. 
The first dimension outlined by Leonard can be combined with the first source of SP 
suggested by Nye. The latter gave importance to "cultural contact as a means of 
combating negative impressions."28 He distinguishes two types of cultures: "high 
28  George Kennan (US Diplomat and writer), quoted in Nye's "Soft Power"
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culture" (literary and artistic education for the Elites) is aimed at achieving desired 
outcomes among policy makers in the short run (for example international students 
return home with a great appreciation of Palestinian values); and "popular culture" 
which serves to enhance SP through images portrayed by television, cinema and/or 
other media outlets. In this sense, the two concepts of PD and SP are similar in the 
use of news management to achieve desired outcomes through media.
2. Strategic Communications: 
Strategic Communications is a medium term planning of news agenda. Unlike the 
first dimension, which aims at contextualizing and reacting to unexpected events, 
this second dimension is rather a proactive creation of news through activities and 
events designed to reinforce messages and influence foreign public's perceptions. 
This also goes in parallel with Nye's second source of SP. Nye suggests that 
domestic values and policies (such as human rights, democracy, tolerance and other 
powerful sources of attraction) be adopted in the media to enhance the image of a 
state and to advance its foreign policy. Palestinians must proactively work with the 
media and create their own news to get their story told. In the media, the mantra is 
Palestinian terrorism and Israeli insecurity.29 Because of the distortion of realities 
due to the potent Israeli lobby and monopoly over many International Media outlets, 
Palestinians and activists should reveal the hardships facing the Palestinian 
population under the Israeli occupation.  In addition, Palestinians should not only 
29  Edward Said, "Culture and Resistance", South End Press, Cambridge Massachussets, 2003
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communicate their stances on issues, but they should also manage the perceptions of 
the viewer or the reader. If interviewed on CNN, Palestinian speakers must address 
the problematic and common perceptions of Palestinians in particular and Arabs in 
general as terrorists. The ideal solution for a country, Leonard argues, is to have one 
single clear narrative which can unite all different audiences. This is not a simple 
task but it should be part of an organized planning of how to "brand" Palestinians as 
part of the government's media machine. 
3. Relations Building: 
This third long-term dimension developed by Leonard concerns two target groups: 
building lasting relationships with the country's citizens overseas on the one hand 
and foreign key individuals. In the Palestinian case, this third factor of PD involves 
Palestinians in the Diaspora and refugees who would represent the Palestinian 
values to positively attract the public in their resident country to our side. The other 
element of relations building is the need to develop lasting relationships with 
individuals (through scholarships, exchanges, training, conferences, etc…). Again 
this falls within the third source of SP devised by Nye, which is Foreign Policy 
Substance and Style. "…policies that express important values are more likely to be 
attractive when the values are shared."30 The attractiveness highly depends on the 
values we tend to transmit and express through the substance and style of our 
30 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004 Public 
Affairs New York 
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foreign policy.  This approach involves nurturing contacts with others through 
genuine exchange that portrays a detailed picture of a country. 
According to Nye, the world today is diverse because it is composed of states with 
advanced democracies and others with weak institutions and authoritarian rulers. He 
distinguishes three main sources of power: military, economic and soft power. Nye 
adds that the global information age will enhance the importance of soft power. 
"The countries that are likely to be more attractive and gain soft power in the 
information age are those with multiple channels of communication that help to 
frame issues; whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global 
norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy); and whose 
credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international values and policies."31 In 
the following chapter, we will tackle the sources of Palestinian Soft Power that 
could be potentially utilized as part of governmental and non governmental policies. 
1.5. Neorealism and Institutionalism:  where does PD stand?
While the two schools have not directly tackled PD, assumptions will be made 
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Extended from the Classical Realist School, Neo Realism revolves around man's 
eradicable lust for power, or "animus dominandi". Political behaviors, according 
to this theory, rest on egoism because men are competing for scarce resources, 
mainly for power. 32 Neorealists view the world as being characterized by its 
anarchic nature. Unlike domestic politics, international politics takes place in an 
arena that has no central governmental body. From this central fact, flow 
important consequences for the behavior of states. Dark defines anarchy as "the 
absence of a world government to oversee the actions of state". 33 Lack of 
international hierarchy in authority leads states to independently set their agenda, 
based on their national self interests. Although states can make commitments and 
treaties, there is no sovereign power to ensure compliance or punish deviations. 
Because the international system lacks a central agency and because the roles of 
international institutions are limited (due to the fact that they only serve the great 
powers), the state, or the "actor", which is a unit in this anarchic system, performs 
actions that are governed by its decision making domestically. Neorealists argue 
that the unit (i.e. the state) should function as a unitary body with one voice. 
Since states cannot look to a supreme body to enforce laws, they must rely on 
their own efforts. According to Rosenau, states must preserve their independence 
and well-being in a self help system generated by the absence of a higher 
32 Kenneth Waltz, "Man, the State and War", NY, Columbia University Press, 1959 
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authority to maintain world justice and order. A state should maximize its power 
in comparison to other units.34 Waltz adds that in a self help system, where 
conflicts are expected to occur, states should be concerned with the means to 
sustain and protect themselves.35
For Neorealists, the international system is divided into two main components: 
the System or Structure and the Unit. The former contains all the states with their 
differing capabilities and interactions; while the latter is the state. Baldwin argues 
that the international structure (i.e. the other units and their interactions) could 
provide opportunities for the actor but it could also add some constraints.36 
States, according to Neorealists, should depend on the means they can generate 
and the arrangements they can make for themselves in this anarchical system. As 
outlined by Dougherty, states operate according to the resources and the means 
they can utilize to ensure their survival and preserve their security.37  Also, 
Dougherty argues that for a state to operate efficiently, it must grasp the 
relationships between units in the structure. 
34  James N. Rosenau, "Innovation and Transformation in International Studies", Stephen Gill & 
James H. Mittelman ed. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997
35  Kenneth N. Waltz, "Man, the State and War", Columbia University Press, NY, 2001
36   David Baldwin, "Neoliberalism and Neorealism: the Contemporary Debate", NY, Columbia 
University Press, 1993
37  James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, "Contending Theories of International Relations,  a 
comprehensive survey. USA: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers. 1997. 4th ed. 
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Security and therefore Power is the essence for the Neorealist theory; but how to 
acquire, preserve and expand it essentially depends on the state's position in the 
global power configuration. According to Waltz, the national interests conduct 
the state's foreign policy. The national interests of a state range from survival 
(minimum goal) to domination (maximum goal). For Dougherty, states achieve 
their objectives either through increasing their internal capabilities or through 
strengthening their alliances and weakening their opponents.38 
In an anarchical self help environment in which states are subject to unexpected 
structural variations, states act on the basis of struggle for survival.39  On the 
same note, Lebow argues that despite the international state of lawlessness, each 
unit (or state) adapts itself to the structure of the system in which it operates.40 
Moreover, Neorealists believe that powerful states (such as the USA) use their 
economic might as an essential instrument of statecraft in order to ensure and 
boost their security. The more capacities are enhanced, the more powerful and 
secure the state becomes. According to Grieco, uncertainties (about future 
structural variations and other units' intentions) lead states to improve their 
capacities as a form of guarantee to security and independence.41  Anarchy leads 
38   James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, "Contending Theories of International Relations,  a 
comprehensive survey. USA: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers4th ed. 1997. 
39  Paul Viotti and Mark Kaupli, " International Relations Theory, Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and 
Beyond", ed. 3ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999
40  Richard Ned Lebow, " International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", NY, 
Columbia University Press, 1995
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to uncertainty and war; hence the struggle for power42, and the necessity to 
consider security issues. 
As for the role of institutions, Neorealists argue that international institutions are 
conditioned by the anarchic nature of the International System. Institutions arose 
only to achieve the goals of the powerful states. For neorealists, institutions are 
nothing but a representation of the true power or shadow powers, reflecting the 
real power distribution in the structure of the system. State interests are above 
institutions.43 Moreover, institutions were created to serve the needs of the most 
powerful states.44 For this school of thought, the power distribution in the 
international structure is the essence: states are the principal actors; whereas non-
state actors such as international organizations, the United Nations, the Security 
Council, etc… are dependent on strong states that determine their functions. 
Neorealism views institutions as permissive and subservient to power politics, 
lacking enforcement mechanisms that are independent of state interests.45 
Institutions cannot prevent wars or achieve peace through changing states' 
behaviors – the current US war on Iraq provides good example. For neorealists, 
41  Joseph M. Grieco, " Neoliberalism and Neorealism: the Contemporary Debate", NY, Columbia 
University Press, 1993 
42  Arnold Wolfers, " International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Economy and Decision-Making", USA: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1985
43  Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of International Politics", ? 1979
44  K.R. Dark, "The Waves of Time, Long-term Change and International Relations", NY: 
Continuum, 1998
45  Michael N. Barnett, "Conceptual Foundations of International Politics", Vol I, School of 
International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, Fall 1997, Foreign Affairs Customs 
Anthology 
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institutions cannot create a change. The latter can only be achieved through the 
rise and fall of the great powers that are in constant competition with each other.46 
Change in the International System is associated with the capacities of each of the 
unit (state) of the structure. States make their own cost-benefit calculations; if 
benefits exceed costs, the state will make the change. 
Going back to the anarchic characteristic of the system, war is a recurrent and 
logical resultant in international relations. Because each state strives to achieve its 
own national interests, it might require using force depending on its power. Each 
state is a judge of its own cause and therefore decides to use force or "hard 
power" to enforce its own judgment.47 
Neorealism is a school of thought that strongly believes that International 
Relations primarily revolve around security and economic matters. The basic 
assumptions of neorealists are that states are the main actors and that the national 
interest of a state is to be pursued. In addition, power, measured in terms of 
military and economic capability, is the clue to analyzing politics. The internal 
organization of the state is not given importance. For neorealists, there is no 
central agency; hence the International System is shared by anarchy. While the 
state acts for its survival, it should simultaneously “struggle for power”, as 
46  K.R. Dark, "The Waves of Time, Long-term Change and International Relations", NY: 
Continuum, 1998
47  Kenneth Waltz, "Man, the State and War", NY, Columbia University Press, 1959   
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Morgenthau48 puts it.  Wars break out because of a growth in power; the state 
should therefore take countermeasures to build up its military strength.  For 
neorealists, power is the only relevant factor in politics. In addition to power 
(defined as military or economic capability of the state or as the state’s influence 
or willingness to use its capabilities over another state), realists use “system” as 
patterns of interaction and anarchy. The system as interaction means that states 
interact in order to predict the behavior of each other: the patterns of behavior 
between and among states are the basis for prediction. 
Neorealists also present an anarchic structure of the system to explain that states 
are sovereign and exercise complete authority over their territories. The absence 
of a central authority explains why states rely on power and seek to preserve and 
even increase their power position. States are therefore in a consistent security 
dilemma: how can a state know that a rival is arming strictly for defensive 
purposes? Distrust therefore characterizes the relationship among states. This 
situation reinforces misunderstandings among states and could even lead to 
"imagined hostility".49 In the International System, alliance building should be 
established in order to avoid the triumph of a dominant power. For neorealists, a 
hegemonic state facilitates the achievement of collaboration among states. The 
"realist assumptions that states are egoistic rational actors operating on the basis 
48  Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations
49  Robert Jervis, "Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics", Princeton University 
Press, NJ, 1976 
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of their own conceptions of self interest" 50 underlies the importance of powerful 
means to use against potential outside threat – PD could be such a tool if military 
strength is absent.  
For Neorealists, Diplomacy is an important element of national power. The State 
(leading the local public opinion) should set itself goals which it has the ability to 
achieve. Again, the objectives of foreign policy must be defined only terms of the 
state's national interest.51
1.5.2. Institutionalism:
This school of thought is derived from Liberalism, identified with an essential 
principle: freedom of the individual. This principle has generated rights and 
institutions. Institutionalism focuses on state interactions that would lead to their 
cooperation. The role of international institutions is to produce norms and rules with 
50  Robert O. Keohane, "After Hegemony" Cooperation & Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1984
51 Hans J. Morgenthau, The Future of Diplomacy, In Robert C. Art, Robert Jervis, "International 
Politics", Fourth Edition, Harper, Collins College Publishers, 1996
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a view to managing state interactions.52 For institutionalists, issues that enhance 
cooperation are the most primordial ones. Institutionalist scholars study the 
conditions required to reach international cooperation, leading to reciprocal benefits. 
Cooperation already exists on a number of low level politics, such as unemployment 
problems, food allocation and other socio-economic issues. Such cooperation in low 
politics is mainly functioned through international agencies. Institutions are not only 
"formal organizations with headquarters buildings and specialized staffs" but more 
as "patterns of practice" affecting state behavior.53 
Like Neorealists, Institutionalists believe that the International system is anarchic, 
"in the sense that it lacks an authoritative government that can enact and enforce 
rules of behavior."54 In other words, states exist in a lawlessness situation where 
there is no body to impose norms; but where there is room for states to adopt game 
theoric applications in order to achieve mutual interests, enhance their welfare and 
maximize their profit.  55   For a state to decide whether to cooperate or defect with 
another state, they should devise a strategy depending on the other actor's strategy.56 
52 John A. Vasquez, "The Power of Power Politics, From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism , 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998 
53   Robert O. Keohane, "After Hegemony" Cooperation & Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1984 
54  ibid
55
56  Robert  Axelrod & Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:    
          Strategies and Institutions”. In Neoliberalism and Neorealism: the           Contemporary Debate, 
David Baldwin, ed. New York: Columbia    
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Cooperation, Institutionalists argue, can only be realized through institutions. In fact, 
as their name suggests, Institutionalists have stressed the importance of institutions 
in organizing and managing state's interactions. Although international institutions 
appear to be state-centric, they embody non-state actors, such as the NATO (security 
body), the IMF (economic system) or Green Peace (environmental organization).57 
Therefore, despite the absence of an international central body to enforce rules, there 
are a number of institutions that play the role of a governing body.58 On the same 
note, Stern advances that International Law is an essential organization setting 
binding rules and norms and prescribing specific modes of conduct for states. The 
International Court of Justice is a case in point. Although states are still predominant 
in the international scene, their interdependence impels them to look for long-term 
aims and multilateral cooperation.  Although states unilaterally pursue their own 
interests in some issues, they still have to allot some kind of authority to 
international institutions.  Thus, the anarchic order of the International System exists 
in parallel with balanced constraints imposed on states to achieve cooperation and to 
reduce their search for self interests only. Institutionalists argue that the 
establishment of rules and institutions has narrowed down state's seeking out their 
self interests.59   
          University Press 1993
57  James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, "Contending Theories of International Relations,  a 
comprehensive survey. USA: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers. 1997. 4th ed.
58  John A. Vasquez, "The Power of Power Politics, From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism", 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998 
59  Geoffrey Stern, "The Structure of International Society, An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations", 2nd Ed. UK: Continuum, 2000 
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Institutions are not a reflection of the balance of power present in the International 
System as Neorealists claim; institutions have the power to mitigate anarchy and to 
change the distribution of power of actors. Vasquez goes far to say that institutions 
help in resolving disputes, paving the way for cooperation among states.60 On the 
other hand, Institutionalists argue that states' shared interests feed their cooperation. 
The notion of interdependence through cooperation is highly stressed here. As 
Dougherty argues, interdependence refers to individuals or groups that play different 
roles in various systems.61 Cooperation can be realized through game theory in terms 
of the Prisonner's Dilemma; i.e. two actors could benefit from cooperation but fail to 
achieve cooperation due to the patterns of incentives generated by the structure of 
strategic interaction between among units.62 Keohane argues that defection (failure 
to achieve cooperation) depends on the number of times the game is played. The 
fewer times it is played, the more likely defection will be the dominant strategy. If 
the game is, however, played iteratively, cooperation between actors can rationally 
emerge if actors value future rewards.63 Why? Because in an iterated Prisonner's 
Dilemma, mutual cooperation develops around a strategy of "tit-for-tat" between 
rational players. Iterated games between players is the most appropriate game 
60  John A. Vasquez, "The Power of Power Politics, From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism", 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998
61 James E Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, "Contending Theories of International Relations,  a 
comprehensive survey. USA: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers. 1997. 4th ed. 
62  Robert O. Keohane, "After Hegemony" Cooperation & Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1984
63  ibid
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model, according to Keohane, because it allows each actor to better understand the 
routine diplomatic conduct of the other actor. 
So where does PD stand? One can consider the possibility of a synthesis between the 
two theories. In fact, if interconnected together, both Neorealism and 
Institutionalism yield valuable insights about PD. Both theories agree that states are 
the main actors in the International System and that anarchy emanated from the 
interactions of units. They also concur that states are propelled by their own self 
interests. However, the two theories identify different mechanisms through which 
units interact within the International System. For Neorealists, the interactions occur 
on the basis of rational behavior. In other words, units that behave rationally 
"possess consistent, ordered preferences, and… calculate the costs of benefits of 
alternatives… in order to maximize their utility…"64 Institutionalists, however, give 
particular importance to institutions in facilitating states' interactions. Neorealism 
views institutions as constraints for states' operations; while Institutionalism 
considers institutions to be acting as facilitators for states' functions. The dividing 
line between Neorealism and Institutionalism therefore concerns how institutions 
affect state behavior. The two theoretical approaches can be incorporated to 
formulate a comprehensive framework, leading to a better understanding of Foreign 
Policy and PD. In fact, adopting one single theory does not suffice to explore 
Foreign Policy and PD. We will therefore take the Neorealist stand of treating state 
as a principal actor and the major player in PD and the Institutionalist's assumption 
64  ibid
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that international institutions have become fundamental actors for political analysis. 
As Keohane puts it: "Realism, at the best of times, only gives a one-sided and 
simplified model of foreign policy,… Other theoretical approaches, notably 
institutionalism and constructivism, are needed to explain foreign policy, not just as 
a supplement to the dominant realist paradigm, but as vital ingredients to any 
credible explanation of a state's conduct in the international system."65 Both schools 
of thought are complementary in the understanding of the concept of PD: while the 
latter refers to the government's actions to generate support for the national security 
objectives, it should also be designed to cover other aspects of interests, such as the 
economic, social and cultural ones – all being essential elements of foreign policy. 
In summary, after exploring the various definitions of PD and incorporating the 
concept within the two theories, we can deduce that a "skilled" PD should therefore 
be an instrument used by the State to serve the national interests and aspirations of 
that same state. To function properly and on a wider scale, PD involves different 
actors, ranging from public and private bodies, to local and international Non 
Governmental Organizations, and media outlets, all acting together to advance the 
state's foreign policy objectives and to improve the State's image abroad. 
1.6. Why do we need PD?
65  ibid
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Malcolm Kerr made relevant observations about the misconceptions pervading the 
Palestinian Israeli conflict. Kerr argues that "a body of assumptions and 
misconceptions, rarely challenged or debated, had grown up about the origins of the 
conflict, and serious discourse had ceased among the public and except in rare 
instances among policymakers as well."66 In fact, Palestinians have not won the 
propaganda battle with Israel in the West. Although the facts of the Palestinian 
reality are well known and well documented, it is still the Israeli narrative which is 
the predominant one. There are many reasons for this. Not all of them have to do 
with Palestinian failures to accurately present their case. Fighting against the Israeli 
narrative is not easy because there are religious and political ties and mutual 
interests between Israel and the US and Europe which are beyond the reach of 
Palestinians. Because any country’s foreign policies are designed to serve that 
country’s national interests, they will cause conflicts when they run counter to the 
interests of others. Therefore, governments should mitigate the tensions caused by 
any conflict of interest by implementing drastic PD campaigns. Palestine has been 
particularly lax in this regard: no effective medium has been put into place through 
which to get the message across to the West.67 For example, the Palestinian 
dispossession (1948 Nakba) is, to a great extent, an unrecognizable episode in the 
Western media and history. The Israeli version of the claims to the Palestinian land 
has prevailed in the international discourse. Another example of misrepresenting the 
Palestinian plight is the constant repetition (which has become THE TRUE STORY) 
of Palestinians fleeing their homes in 1948 because the Palestinian leadership gave 
66  Kathleen Christison, "Perceptions of Palestine", University of California Press, 1999
67  ibid
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people orders to leave. This propaganda was successfully circulated to reach the 
Western perceptions. While the Israeli perspective was a dominant one in the 
Western mind, there was no room for the Palestinian standpoint. However, Israel's 
version and media supremacy of the events can still be challenged. This is where PD 
is positioned. There is still an opportunity to push the Palestinian narrative to the 
front. In addition to this reason related to the Palestinian peculiar case, there are 
other reasons for PD. The first reason is the global rise in the power of individual 
citizens in the policy making process. 
Today's communication revolution has allowed an instantaneous flow of information 
reaching large publics everywhere, disregarding physical national boundaries, and 
directly affecting the formation of public attitudes. Public opinion has become an 
important  factor in International Relations because it exerts pressure on 
governments' decisions and actions.68 The universal reach of media and information 
technology (especially the wrenching of images on televisions and the internet based 
news agency) has an immediate effect on states' policy. 
The second reason for the rise of PD is the new ideological dimensions of 
international conflicts. There is a big competition among states and groups to 
promulgate their policies and penetrate the human thinking. This reason applies to 
most Arab and Islamic states after the 9/11 tragic events, which have exacerbated 
68  Hans N. Tuch "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY, 1990
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ideological conflicts and have required that Arabs and Muslims rehabilitate their 
image in the West.  
1.7. How does PD function? 
In his "Pillars of Public Diplomacy"69 article, Christopher Ross presents a basic set 
of principles and practices, what he calls "the seven pillars of PD". These principles 
guide the State's (in this case Palestine) adoption and engagement in an efficient PD 
that would benefit its foreign policy:    
1. The first principle is "Policy Advocacy", i.e. the first 
responsibility must be to ensure that international audiences 
understand Palestine. PD is incorporated in foreign policy; it is 
integrated in the process of policy formulation and 
implementation of the government. 
2.  The second pillar of PD is "Reasons & Rationale": 
governments must build genuine understanding and common 
ground with the outside world. 
3. Thirdly, the government should develop consistent and 
truthful information message, or what the author terms as 
69  Christopher Ross, "Pillars of Public Diplomacy: grappling with international public opinion", 
www.questia.com 
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"Tailoring Credibility". PD must be based on honesty, openness 
and trust in order to be successful. 
4. The fourth pillar concerns the audience – different messages 
should be employed separately to each group of audiences (the 
messenger should be skilful and knowledgeable of different 
interest groups); the message employed will be different if 
addressed to a religious group from the message sent to 
representatives of the private sector, for example. Furthermore, 
tailoring the message to specific audiences should be swift 
because silence is vacuum rapidly filled by media outlets with the 
opponent view. 
5. The fifth principal guideline for PD is "Mass Media". In other 
words, states should seek out channels to reach broader audiences 
through all available types of communications channels: the 
internet based media, broadcasting, print publications and press, 
traveling speakers and educational and cultural exchanges. 
6. A sixth vital element to be taken into account when 
implementing PD is the internal alliances and partnerships; for 
example establishing partnerships with the private sector (through 
the involvement of local Public Relations firms), with Non 
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Governmental Organizations and Palestinians in the diaspora 
would be an added value because it would offer a third party 
authenticity. 
7. Finally, the most obvious yet elusive factor is the launch of 
dialogues and exchanges with the outside world. It is essentially 
important to listen to the world and speak to it because it will 
create avenues for dialogue and will pave the way for advocacy of 
Palestinian policies as clearly and powerfully as possible. Here, 
the author puts emphasis on the delivery of messages in a proper 
context. 
Hence, PD is a multi-layered process involving a multitude of actors, numerous 
ways of communication and several guiding principles. All these inextricable 
components of PD are advanced by the state. These multifaceted dynamics 
characterizing PD serve as a framework for PD practical activities which will be 
tackled in the next paragraph. 
Drawing on her experience as an American practitioner in the field, Pamela Smith 
describes two major PD programs conducted: information programs and cultural and 
educational programs.70
70  www.diplomacy.edu 
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1. Information Programs:
This program concerns the media (see paragraph on "the role of the media") and 
the functions of diplomatic missions as defined by the Vienna Convention on the 
Diplomatic relations.71 The latter identifies the role of the diplomat, as 
representative of the sender state within the host state, getting acquainted with 
the courses of events within the host state and reporting on it to the government 
of the sender state, while simultaneously advancing and developing friendly 
relations with the host state. In practice, this means the following main regular 
actions are to be performed by government officials and diplomats:
- Government officials should gather all the speeches, position papers, 
transcripts of press conferences or any public announcements of the 
government. All these materials should be compiled and sent 
electronically to all the embassies abroad; they should also be posted on 
the government's website for immediate access to the information. 
Additionally, such information should be translated into world languages. 
- Government officials develop strategies on how best to convey their 
positions on important issues. 
71  http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/diplomat.htm 
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- Diplomats at embassies overseas manage the dissemination locally of 
all the material coming from the sender state. Dissemination is not only 
at the official level, it spreads to civil organizations and individuals with 
high sensitivity to local issues and concerns and by means of using the 
local language in a fluent manner. 
- The Government's Information Program also includes responding to 
public inquiries about one's own countries. This means that diplomats act 
as the information front ends of their governments by responding to large 
amounts of queries on a daily basis. 
2. Cultural and Educational Programs:
Cultural and Educational Programs are important long term components of PD, 
providing a deep understanding of a country's society, values, institutions and 
motives for forming its official positions. Such programs (performed by state 
and non state actors) stand on a principle that information and cultural programs 
must circumvent the momentary goals of foreign politics and focus on highest 
national goals. These include, among other things:
- Organizing workshops and/or academic exchange programs and 
inviting foreign researchers, students and professors to strengthen bonds 
of understanding the Palestinian situation.
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- Sending artists abroad to attend an exhibition or to perform the 
country's popular dances and music is another important cultural 
component.
- Using modern communications technology to apply PD and expose 
the cultural richness of Palestine. 
In a similar vein, Mark Leonard has developed an interesting understanding of PD, 
being "based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public 
goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual 
transaction… the global anti-capitalist demonstrations have illustrated a new 
diplomatic environment where state and non-state actors compete for the public's 
attention".72 In fact, states are striving for the best holistic presentation, promotion 
and "branding". By "branding" is meant that states are competing for the affection of 
the public like market brands; by ascribing an emotional value to a country, people 
can identify with it.73
Today's PD is operated on a dual scale: traditional diplomacy is preserved as defined 
by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, while simultaneously enlarging 
its operation through networking with various non state actors, communicating 
72  Mark Leonard, "Public Diplomacy", Foreign Policy Center, 2002 
73  Ham, Van Peter, "Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of PR and IR Theory. 
Millenium:. Journal of International Studies 31, 2002
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through different channels and in product marketing manners with the aim of 
nurturing one's own country. 
1.8. The role of NGOs
During the Cold War, Diplomacy and international affairs were mostly conducted by 
governments. The end of the Cold War allowed non state actors to appear on the 
scene. 
As Jessica T. Matthews puts it: 
"The End of the Cold War has brought no mere adjustment among states but 
a novel redistribution of power among states, markets and civil society. 
National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing 
economy. They are sharing powers – including political, social, and security 
roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, with international 
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organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as non 
governmental organizations (NGOs). 74 
PD, by involving different actors, presents many differing views as seen by private 
individuals, organizations, in addition to official governmental views.
Today, the powerful engine of change is the computer and telecommunications 
revolution, both leading to a relative decline of states and a rise of non state actors. 
In fact, some scholars claim that the Westphalian system, introduced in 1648, has 
come 
to an end with the elimination of the concentration of power in the hands of states. 
In the wake of the cold war, local processes and identities have rendered the 
Westphalian system obsolete.75 The Westphalian international system is 
characterized by international mediation through a classical form of diplomacy and a 
state-centric notion of sovereignty; whereas the new international system is derived 
from a grass roots movement. The Westphalian system used inadequate approaches 
because state interests have proven to be manipulated.76   In fact, NGOs have deeply 
penetrated into the official decision making. In Palestine, for example, some NGOs 
complement the Palestinian Authority in the delivery of public services, such as the 
74  "Conceptual Foundations of International Politics", Volume I, School of International and Public 
Affairs, Columbia University, Fall 1997 
75  Martin Shaw, "Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical, and 
'Political Limits' of International Society", 1992 
76  Olivier P. Richmond, "NGOs and an Emerging Form of Peacemaking: Post-Westphalian 
Approached", International Studies Association, CA, March 2000
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Medical Relief which delivers health services or Tamer Institute which delivers 
educational services. 
Neoliberal scholars argue that institutions are "significant because they affect state 
behavior".77 Institutions play a vital role in achieving state interests. The recent 
condemnation of the Israeli Wall built on Palestinian territories by the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague is a case in point. This international institution served 
the Palestinian demands for such a denunciation.  
In a similar vein, Leonard distinguishes three major non state actors that positively 
complement the government's PD operations: NGO Diplomacy, Diaspora 
Diplomacy and Political Parties Diplomacy. 
It is necessary to work with NGOs abroad for their effectiveness in communication 
– in fact, their role has proven to be central in influencing their governments. They 
possess three key resources that serve the government's foreign policy: they are 
credible because of their independency, they have experience in marshaling 
networks to exert pressure in an area (the latest anti-war demonstrations are a good 
example) and they have the appropriate networks, facilitating advocacy.  For 
example, the Palestinian NGO Network has widely contributed, during the second 
Palestinian Intifada, in making timely releases of information to the International 
77  Robert O. Keohane, "After Hegemony" Cooperation & Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 1984
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Community on the Israeli human rights violations, and in confronting the tarnished 
image of Palestinians in the Western media. 78  
Secondly, citizens in the diaspora represent another added value to the government's 
PD performance as they can yield advantages to policy makers in the countries they 
live because they can address decision makers, the public and the media in a cultural 
language they can understand. Finally, political parties are an important asset, 
especially when there are exchange programs with outside political parties. This 
gives a clear idea of the political position, and reflects political pluralism while 
constructing an image about one's country. 
The experience of NGOs in Palestine most probably supercedes that of any other 
country in conflict areas in the world.79 Regarding their political role, Palestinian 
NGOs regarded their work as an integral component of national liberation and the 
desire for a just government. In essence, Palestinian NGOs served as a shadow 
government, providing the means and motivation to continue the popular struggle 
for national values. Palestinian NGOs were the main pillar of development during 
the pre-Oslo period. They provided services in health, agriculture, education, 
communications media, information, human rights, women's issues, research and 
78  Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, "The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, Donors, 
International Organizations and Local NGOs", Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Muwatin, the 
Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, Jerusalem, 2005
79  ibid 
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training programs. At the same time, they played an active role in the popular 
resistance to the occupation and maintained a steadfast presence through the long, 
weary years of negligence and repression. These same NGOs attained a high degree 
of social, developmental, and political status, and also became tools for social 
evolution. Palestinian NGOs, strengthened by their political affiliations, functioned 
for 30 years as a substitute for a national authority. The World Bank has estimated 
that at the end of 1994, NGOs accounted for 60% (by value) of primary health care 
services, and 50 % of all secondary and tertiary health care services. One hundred 
percent of programs for disabled people and preschool children, as well as a sizable 
proportion of agricultural, housing, small business credit, and welfare services were 
also provided by NGOs. (see www.worldbank.org)  Until the Oslo Accords, to speak 
of a "non-political NGO" in Palestine was a contradiction in terms. Even nominally 
apolitical NGOs, because of the political involvement and activism of their staff 
members, planned and implemented programs within the context of a political 
vision. NGO vision and strategy focused exclusively on issues relating to social 
injustice, marginalized groups, inequality, gender issues, education, agriculture, etc. 
In short, in the absence of a government, their task was to facilitate the building of a 
civil society80. Consequently, Palestinian NGO work was founded on a political 
identity, and its effectiveness dependent on the political atmosphere within which it 
worked. Not so in the aftermath of Oslo. The emergence of the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) has marginalized the role of NGOs until the breakthrough of the Al 
80  Broadly speaking, Civil Society means "the summarizing term for non-state forms of collective 
actions", Robert Haas, "Media Today and Tomorrow", The Concept of "Civil Society", Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation, 2000 
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Aqsa Intifada. Since 2000, Palestinian NGOs have turned to act as humanitarian 
agencies in the services of the people and advocacy player, lobbying against the 
Israeli aggressive policies, each in their own field (Israeli violations on ambulances 
and medics, on women, children, etc…). The next chapter will tackle the types of 
coordination between Palestinian NGOs and NGOs abroad to make the Palestinian 
voice heard, and to turn the foreign audience into advocates of the Palestinian cause.
1.9. The role of the media 
The media explosion and the proliferation of information that have buffeted the 
world in the 1990ies have created an information-intensive global environment 
where international crises play out directly into domestic issues. Moreover, the 
media has entered the diplomatic sphere: not only does it respond to the 
international political events, but it also invades the processes of communication 
between the governments and the publics about international politics. It is an 
important tool for state and non-state actors alike. The importance of the media 
lies in its widespread connection to the public and its speed in conveying a 
message. It is often the main component of PD for it represents an opportunity for 
a state (even a small state) to influence and shape international agenda beyond the 
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hard powers of strong states.81 With technological advances and the rise of new 
communication techniques, such as the internet, the media has become the main 
engine that drives PD. In fact, evaluating the performance of PD depends on the 
message sent through media outlets. 
If we consider the 1920s to be the decade of the transistor and the 1950s the 
decade of the television, the 1990s were by far the age of satellites and the 
internet. The latter has played a bigger role than satellite television in providing 
alternative information to local media, and governments could not restrict this 
flow of information. In addition, technology has allowed researchers to access 
libraries throughout the world and students to search for literature. All over the 
globe, the development of satellite channels has offered an extensive range of 
news information to a wide group of people. 
In the midst of technological advances in mass media and communication, 
Palestine has not really engaged in an aggressive campaign to promote its image 
and expose the Israeli lies about the conflict among the Western media. In 
addition, Palestine has failed to find a unified voice within the media in the West 
to establish coverage on Palestinian issues. No real Palestinian initiative has been 
conducted toward the Western media, with "infotainment82" or subjects that 
81  Josef Batora, "Multistakeholder Public Diplomacy of Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway 
and Canada Compared", University of Oslo, 2005
82  By infotainment is meant "the presentation of a series of data – true or false, important or trivial – 
whose main aim is entertaining the public, though it is cloaked by an informative format", Miriam 
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would be “attractive” and/or sensitive to this audience.  For example, 
personifying stories of Palestinians under the Israeli occupation, or showing how 
Israel uproots Palestinian trees, or even exposing Palestinian residents who are 
surrounded by the Wall in Qalqilya and who can no longer see the sun; such facts 
deeply affect the viewers. 
There are several methods to deal with the media in conducting PD, Tuch argues. 
These methods are considered to be efficient tools to reach out to the foreign 
public through media outlets. Tuch suggests 9 different methods that need to be 
tremendously practiced and highlighted in the media83:
1. The Wireless File:
This component suggests that embassies all over the world issue daily bulletins, 
comprising the President's speeches and statements, the Parliament's Press 
Releases, scripts of briefings and press conferences, commentaries from 
(Palestinian) press, and (Palestinian) foreign relations and policies. This so-
called "Wireless File" is a "state-of-the-art communication medium"84, providing 
information and news services for media outlets. Surfing the Israeli Ministry of 
Hinojosa de Girardet, "Media Today and Tomorrow", Infotainment instead of Political Coverage?, 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Robert Haas (ed.), 2000 
83  Hans N. Tuch "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY, 1990
84  ibid 
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Foreign Affairs85 (note that it is in English, Hebrew and Arabic languages), in 
addition to all of the above mentioned documents in the wireless file, one can 
find that it not only is a propaganda against Palestinians, with a special chapter 
entitled "Terrorism", but it is also a means to connect with Jews abroad. For 
example, the MASA project which aims at encouraging young Jews to spend a 
semester or a year in an Israeli university. 
2. Press and Publications:
Press and Publications encompass all types of printing materials/periodicals that 
are circulated. These periodicals specialize in various subjects (economy, 
environment, culture, politics, etc…) and help build a solid media and public 
outreach policy.
3. Exhibitions:
Although this element of PD is costly, organizing exhibits on specific themes 
about one's country does convey specific messages to the public and the media. 
85  www.mfa.gov.il 
49
Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
"They are rightfully regarded as excellent media of communication"86 because 
they constitute a forum that offers opportunities for exchanges and states' 
competition. 
4. Cultural and Information Centers:
"Our education services include information and advice about UK education and 
exams. Our activities in the arts, education, human rights and governance aim to 
provide opportunities for cultural dialogue and mutual understanding".87 This is 
part of the mission of the British Council in Palestine. This institution is a model 
for other British Council organizations and US Cultural and Information Centers 
throughout the world, introduced as important elements of PD programs. 
Creating cultural centers is costly and should be carefully considered by the PD 
Officers in embassies. The latter must "consider the purpose, the pros and cons 
of a new center before establishing it. Is there a significant audience for the 
center? Are there alternatives for establishing a library, for instance, a university 
library…?88"
5. Binational Centers:
86  Hans N. Tuch "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY, 1990
87  www.britishcouncil.org/ps 
88  Hans N. Tuch "Communicating with the world", St. Martin's Press, NY, 1990
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Serving long-term PD objectives, these centers are cooperative ventures between 
two governments, with possibility of private sector involvement. The library, in 
cultural centers (whether bilateral or not) is a vital instrument used not in a 
passive manner, where the librarian waits for visitors, but it is rather used to 
communicate with specific targeted audiences. For instance, materials with a 
particular subject of interest are compiled and sent out to potential readers. Tuch 
calls this "the Article Alert List".89 Furthermore, staff members in these centers 
interact with local cultural and education institutions, forming an impetus for 
advancing PD objectives.  
6. Book Translations:
This instrument is deemed useful in promoting the image of one's country. 
Although it is also costly, it could serve the PD objectives if there is wide 
readership and if the books are of particular significance to a foreign audience.90 
Sometimes, in order to provide some form of "attraction" to readers, the author 
of a book is invited at the host country to make a presentation of his/her book. 
89  ibid 
90  See for example Salma Khadra Jayyusi "Anthology of Modern Palestinian Literature", Columbia 
Press NY, 1992 – in this publication, the author collects the work materials of several Palestinian 
poets scattered over many countries and translated them from Arabic into English, thus "bringing the 
treasures of Palestinian culture to the attention of the world" as put by Jayyusi
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7. Teaching (your language):
For many years, the English language programs conducted in many countries by 
the US government have been the central focus of US PD. Such programs have 
been regarded as important tools of PD and as a way to convey specific 
information and ideas about the United States. In fact, such tools have 
significantly made positive contributions to the US image, garnering wide 
support (especially amongst the youth) for US cultural and educational values. 
8. Educational and Cultural Exchange:
Again, the US has made good use of this important PD resource, especially 
through the Fullbright programs which offer scholarships to local people to 
study in the US. Moreover, the Youth Exchange Study Program offered by 
Amideast "give secondary school students in many Arab and Islamic countries 
an opportunity to study at American high schools and live with American host 
families for one academic year".91  Coordinators of this program assert in their 
brochures that such programs will not only allow for better understanding of US 
culture, but they add that it will also benefit (Palestinian) students to "help 
Americans learn about (your) their country".92 
91  http://www.amideast.org/offices/westbank/programs_services/yeswb.htm 
92  ibid 
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9. Personal Contact with journalists:
Finally, personal contacts with journalists are a particularly effective tool in 
achieving PD objectives. Foreign journalists stationed or visiting our country are 
an important source to get the message through and to enhance the image. These 
journalists highly appreciate the special service in obtaining all necessary 
information on the spot. PD objectives are best achieved through news and 
information centers providing and spreading out regular information and press 
releases, along with the person-to-person contact with journalists. For example, 
there are many foreign journalists who espouse and campaign for the Palestinian 
cause, and with whom there should be a consolidation of relationships from the 
government93 ; however, PR efforts should also be placed on media experts who 
take the Israeli stand in their writings and/or reporting. 
1.10. Conclusion
The characteristics of PD can be summed up in the following diagram concentric 
circles. (see Figure 1.1.) In it, the central player in PD is the President, his key 
advisers and the Foreign Affairs Minister. In the second circle are the major PD 
Departments whose heads' responsibility would be to report directly to the central 
93  Michael Adams is a particularly good example as he sacrificed his career for the Palestinian cause, 
to know more about this British journalist, see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/0,3604,1407844,00.html
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player. The outer circle consists of local actors (political parties, NGOs, 
parliamentary members and the private sector) who are regularly informed of PD 
activities and directions, for a better local cooperation, therefore leading towards 
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Figure 1.1. Programs and Actors involved in PD Operations 
Chapter 2 Practices of Palestinian Public Diplomacy from Camp David to Al Aqsa 
Intifada
2.1. Introduction – a situational analysis
Since its establishment in the late 1800s, Zionism has created myths about the 
Palestinians. These myths have legitimated not only the creation of Israel but also the 
formation of an Israeli, and even a Western- Zionist consensus that justifies whatever 
crime is waged against the Palestinian people by way of killing, destruction, and finally 
building of the Wall and forcible collective expulsion. Despite the fact that 
misconceptions about Palestine are glaringly false, it is necessary to address them 
seriously. This is because they compose the cornerstone of justification for all the 
crimes that take place today, and the flagrant violation by Israel of the full body of 
international law, primarily the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, that governs and 








Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
misconceptions thus form the blank check for all that the Jewish State practices. So it is 
necessary and in the common interests of the Palestinian leadership and all other 
Palestinian actors to convey the clearest of messages to the Israeli and international 
public at large, by deconstructing the cynicism of these misconceptions. The Israeli 
propaganda machine has paved the way for striking at the Palestinians after the eruption 
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, in the shadow of Palestinian silence at the time regarding a 
narrative for what took place at Camp David.94 This will be revealed in more details in 
2.3.  
In fact, until this day, Palestinians have not yet won the information and media 
battleground with Israel. The July 2005 Anti-Defamation League (ADL) poll95 
reinforces consistent American negative perceptions of Palestinians. The results of the 
poll reveal that American neglectful sentiments to the Palestinian cause are largely 
traced to Palestinian failings in delivering their case in a rightful manner. For example, 
the poll found that a majority of Americans (52%) believe Israel is currently working 
harder towards peace than the Palestinians. As hard power (military and economic 
strengths) is difficult to be utilized due to the deficiency in Palestinian capabilities and 
the misuse of military attacks against the Israeli occupier, soft power – i.e. the ability to 
attract and maintain alliances and explain ourselves better is important and achievable. 
In other words, SP encompasses the way how we express our policies to the public who 
might not understand and/or agree with them, as well as the vehicles to be used through 
94  Saleh Abdeljawad, www.amin.org 
95  www.adl.org/PresRele/IslME_62/4752_62.htm 
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which we reach such a public. Palestine should struggle to cope with volatile Western 
public opinion. Joseph Nye emphasizes the need for soft power not "just as a question 
of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity."96 He adds that if a state ignores 
the importance of attractiveness to other countries, a high price will be paid.97 However, 
the current Soft Power and therefore Palestinian Diplomacy lack strong political 
leadership, and an organizational structure required to implement a strategic plan over 
the long term. Soft power requires that governments set the agenda in ways that shape 
the preferences of others. What are the Palestinian soft power resources? And how to 
use them in an efficient manner to achieve the Palestinian preferred outcomes? What 
are failures in the Palestinian Public Diplomacy performance from Camp David to the 
intifada for independence? How can Palestine remold its diplomatic structure to adapt to 
the changing information environment? 
2.2. Palestinian Soft Power Resources
Soft Power is mainly the creation of activities through multiple actors and organizations 
with impacts on foreign publics. As pointed out by Nye, in international politics, the 
resources that produce soft power essentially emanate from the values expressed in the 
culture, from the internal policies of a state, and from the way foreign relations are 
handled. He adds that states need not be big to be more influential in world politics. 




Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
Small states in Asia or Europe have increased their soft power and gained prominence 
internationally: the Chinese government has boosted the number of Chinese restaurants 
around the world as a manner to deepen relations with other countries. In Europe, small 
countries such as Switzerland are more trusted internationally than big states. Palestine, 
despite its scarce resources and the military challenges faced with the Israeli occupier, 
can effectively utilize its soft power resources in order to win the battle for world 
attention and support and achieve its national objectives. 
2.2.1. Palestinian Society & Culture 
Soft Power is primarily the creation of activities through multiple actors and 
organizations with impacts on foreign publics. Artists, art galleries, music, peace 
activists, journalists, business people, academic and religious leaders, are all individual 
and societal actors that can influence a broad group of people and broader sets of 
interests that go beyond those of the government. A good example is the role that 
Palestinian culture can play as a form of "consolidation and persistence of Palestinian 
identity… a form of memory against effacement".98 The government is supposed to 
harness the potential of the existing positive images and values associated with non 
state actors. It is therefore essential that there be network relationships between 
governmental officials and non state actors, which would provide mutual benefits in 
terms of soft power.  Any conduct of PD, i.e. the promotion of soft power of a state, 
inevitably involves interactions between the government and all local stakeholders. 
98  Edward  Said, "Culture and Resistance", South End Press, Cambridge Massachussets, 2003
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Leonard points out to the fact that such interactions would not only benefit the state, but 
also state actors because positive images and values, if associated with a state, they 
might have an enabling effect on the activities of non state actors.99 
The UNDP 2003 Human Development Report placed the Palestinian territories among 
nations enjoying an average or mid-level of human development, equal to Turquey's 
and ahead of China, Iran, Algeria, South Africa, Syria, Morocco, India and Egypt. 
Palestine has been ranked ahead of nations that have enjoyed independence for decades 
and that possess relatively enormous capacities, compared to Palestine. Despite the 
degradation of the political environment, the Palestinian society survived against all 
odds. The destruction of PNA institutions by Israel during the second intifada led to a 
destabilized political authority and contributed to the deterioration of the Palestinian 
infrastructure. In spite of the absence of an effective central authority and the Israeli 
imposed facts on the ground (ranging from checkpoints, settlements, and the Wall), 
Palestinians have proven their ability to resist such oppressive policies and maintain 
social unity and cohesion. 
"The absence of panic during shelling and bombing; the capacity (developed 
as the intifada has continued) of mentally circumscribing dangerous areas…; 
the frank and lively debates in public meetings,… the mass participation of all 
99  Mark Leonard, "Public Diplomacy", Foreign Policy Center, 2002 
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social classes in funerals for the victims of extrajudicial assassination- all this 
showed that the Palestinian mood was far from tending toward capitulation."100 
As pointed out in the latest Palestine Human Development Report, "the Palestinian 
human experience is manifested in the capacity to maintain self-control, relationship 
management skills, family, professional and social cohesion, a set of basic civil services 
consistently provided by government institutions, local voluntary support of poor 
families, poverty alleviation programs, and support from relatives and friends 
abroad."101 
Exposing Palestinian figures, and/or even laymen who legally fought and are still 
fighting the Israeli occupation and that have been concerned with the welfare of their 
people is a pressing challenge to be highlighted to the Western audience. Doing so 
would hamper Israeli continuous attempts to thwart any assertion of a Palestinian 
history and identity, or to dehumanize Palestinians, often referred to as "terrorists".
There are many types of Diplomacy that could be used as tools to expose the Palestinian 
society and/or culture in a positive manner:
- People Diplomacy  : 
100  Camille Mansour, "The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, Winter 2002
101  "Palestine Human Development Report 2004", Birzeit University Development Studies Program 
60
Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
One of the best examples of effective mass organization is the non violent resistance in 
Bil'in, where villagers holding out marches  in their defiance campaign: on Friday 16 
September, 2005, "a protest recital" by pianist Jacob Allegro102 took place. The scene of 
a Jewish pianist protesting with Palestinian demonstrators against the building of the 
Wall on Palestinian land is an important event created by the people themselves.  Bil'in 
people should be capturing world headlines with their imaginative, non-violent ways of 
protest, undeterred by the Israeli army violence. 
- NGO Diplomacy  : 
A very good and effective role played by the Palestine Monitor103, the Electronic 
Intifada104 or the Palestinian NGO Network105 is evident, especially in terms of 
providing useful material to various types of organizations, in monitoring the news, in 
maintaining and updating a powerful photo gallery on their websites, in developing 
strong links with various local and international organizations, and in targeting the 
Western media. The work of such NGOs is to accurately monitor the situation (human 
rights violations…) and to ensure that factual information is distributed to all groups 
and organizations both locally and abroad. Such organizations should be (financially) 
supported by the Palestinian National Authority to expand their work to include 
materials in Hebrew and other languages. Other types of NGO Diplomacy are Porto 
102  www.bilin-village.org 
103  www.palestinemonitor.org 
104  www.electronicintifada.net 
105   Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, "The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, Donors, 
International Organizations and Local NGOs", Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Muwatin, the 
Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, Jerusalem, 2005
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Allegre106 and Durban107 Conferences which played an important role in garnering 
support for Palestine. 
- Arts Diplomacy  :  
Palestine should benefit from and develop the existing Artistic groups to reflect the 
daily realities of Palestinian resistance to the occupation. The Popular Art Center, Al 
Qattan Foundation or Sakakini are good cases in point, as they are organizations that 
provide an essential tool used to the preservation of the Palestinian folkloric and 
cultural heritage. As was mentioned before, the underlying assumption is that culture 
carries a powerful message on its own; especially that it "is a way of fighting against 
extinction and obliteration".108 In fact, all forms of activities, including cultural ones, are 
fundamental in PD because they expose a whole people to the foreign audience and 
contribute to the wider development of (Palestinian) art movements. Artistic activities 
do also promote international cultural and artistic exchange, and pave the way for 
networking with other foreign artists, and therefore easily transmitting our message. 
- Diaspora Diplomacy  :
106  World Social Forum, www.portoalegre2002.org
107 This World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, Durban, South Africa, August-September 2001, made suggestions to condemn Israel on 
various grounds, including Racism, www.unhchr.ch 
108  Edward  Said, "Culture and Resistance", South End Press, Cambridge Massachussets, 2003
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This type of Diplomacy involves Palestinians in the Diaspora. The latter have had a 
good track record in mobilizing some Western groups in favor of the Palestinian case 
that serves as a catalyst unifying people through a common identity. Diaspora 
Palestinians Ali Abunimah and Arjan El Fassed have collaborated over the Internet on 
the Electronic Intifada's development, under the slogan "The Revolution will not be 
televised' - but it will be web-based".109 The site has been widely distributed to 
thousands of email addresses throughout the world, generating over 200 subscribers to 
the Electronic Intifada's email alert service in just 48 hours. Internet has been an 
important medium with the least regulation to spread one's ideas. There are many cases 
of Palestinians in the Diaspora that have helped and supported Palestinian steadfastness 
and survival through various means. The end of this chapter will examine ways of 
networking with international communities and strengthening the role that pro-
Palestinian institutions in the West can and should play.  
- Citizen Diplomacy  : 
There are a number of individual efforts aimed at spreading the Palestinian narrative 
in an efficient manner. Edward Said's "Out Of Place" is a personal account of Said 
and his family's exile, with an emphasis on his birthplace in Jerusalem to schools in 
Cairo, summers in Beirut and college in the United States. This autobiography-like 
book is written by a universally recognized and modern thinker, an added value to 
reaching a wide range of readers. Also, "In Search of Fatima: A Palestinian Story", by 
109  www.electronicintifada.net 
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Ghada Karmi is a remarkable memoir of a Palestinian woman telling her personal 
story of exile and displacement. The story revolves around a human experience under 
Mandatory Palestine, and then the Nakba. Writing a dairy or talking about one's own 
experience under the Israeli occupation not only "humanizes" the Palestinian case, but 
also entails that every Palestinian acts as an envoy,  a voice, a spokesperson; 
somebody who would embody and express their people's fullness of experience, 
history, pain and aspirations in a direct and honest way. In fact, this tool is very 
effective in reaching out from a Palestinian viewpoint towards a Western audience. "A 
personal account such as a diary… shows a pure and authentic development of one's 
voice in which the personal act of speaking about one's moral concerns, with all its 
doubts, requires the avoidance of writing in reductive and stereotypical frames such as 
propagandistic discourse."110 The challenge for this category of diplomacy is for 
individuals/citizens to make themselves attractive and relevant as sources of Soft 
Power. This requires state efforts to devise PD training sessions to both state and non 
state structures. 
- Religious Diplomacy  : 
Being the cradle of Jesus Christ, Bethlehem is a special place in the Christians' hearts. 
This is a major resource that Palestine holds; unfortunately this element of "historical 
110  Toine Van Teeffelen, "(Ex)communicating Palestine: From Best-Selling Terrorist Fiction to Real-
Life Personal Accounts, 
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antecedence… has not played a prominent role in the Palestinian struggle".111 The 
importance of such a holy city should not be disregarded and should even be in the 
news, capturing the attention of Western viewers, most of whom are not aware of the 
existence of Palestinian Christians!  Palestinian Christian officials, including the Mayor 
of Bethlehem, should play a pivotal role in exposing the burdens and difficulties faced 
by the city of Bethlehem due to the Israeli expansionist plans. It is also necessary to 
enhance the city's cultural and religious importance in all occasions, especially during 
the visits of groups of religious pilgrimages. 
2.2.2. Palestinian Rights 
Despite high level diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, countless United Nations 
Resolutions, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli occupation troops, have not been 
implemented. Such high level official attempts to find a solution are insufficient if they 
are not backed by an information/PD strategy, leading to awareness and support by the 
international community. A major "political soft power" source for Palestinians are 
these UN affirmed Palestinian rights under International Law in relation to the key 
issues of the Palestinian case: the parity of the two peoples and their right to establish 
respective states on the territory of the former Mandate of Palestine (UN General 
Assembly Resolution 181, 29 November 1947); the Palestinian refugees' right of return 
and compensation (UN General Assembly Resolution 194, 11 December 1948); Israeli 
111  Jean Allain, "Beyond the Armed Struggle, The Relationship of International Law and 
International Organizations to the Palestinian Cause", Ibrahim Ab-Lughod Institute of International 
Studies, Birzeit University, 2005
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withdrawal from territory occupied by force as a result of the 1967 war as mandated by 
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (1967, 1973); the applicability of the 
Palestinian right of self-determination as decisive of any solution (UN General 
Assembly Resolution 34/70, 6 December 1973); and the unconditional applicability of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as the reaffirmation of international and UN law 
that it is inadmissible to acquire territory by force or conquest (UN Security Council 
Resolutions 476 of 30 June 1980, 480 of 12 November 1980, and 1322 of 7 October 
1980). 112 International Law is undoubtedly supportive of the Palestinian national 
aspirations and would lead to an alternate and just peace, replacing the previous so-
called "peace" agreements that only took into consideration what is acceptable to the 
stronger party (Israel) and treated the facts on the ground as "fait accompli" and as the 
basic principles for negotiations. 113
The right of return is protected by several international and human rights laws and 
resolutions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil Rights (ICCR), and United Nations Resolution 194. 
The UDHR affirms that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 
own, and to return to his country” (Article 13).  The ICCR, passed by the U.N. General 
Assembly in 1966, states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter 
his own country" (Resolution 2200). U.N. Resolution 194 resolves that “the refugees 
112  George Toameh, " United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-
1974", Boynton/Cook Publishers; Revised edition (May 1987), see also Rex Brynen's articles on 
FOFOGNET http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/fofognet.html
113  Azmi Bishara, "The Right of Resistance and the Palestinian Ordeal", Journal of Palestine Studies, 
Issue No. 122,  Winter 2002 
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wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be 
permitted to do so at the earliest possible date, and compensation should be paid for the 
property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property”. Finally, 
the 9th of July 2004 advisory opinion of the World Court, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) declares Israel’s Annexation Wall illegal. The ICJ ruling states that the 
“construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, 
are contrary to international law … [and] Israel is under an obligation to terminate its 
breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of 
construction of the wall."114 After the ICJ advisory opinion was issued, the UN General 
Assembly approved Res. ES-10/15, demanding that Israel comply with the ICJ ruling 
on the Wall; the EU also voted in favor of this demand. This ruling proves to be a very 
important decision in the history of the Palestinian struggle endured since the 1948 
Nakba: it not only refers to the illegality of the "Wall" (officially adopting the term 
"Wall" as opposed to the Israeli preferred term of "barrier"), it further addressed Israeli 
actions in the Occupied Territory as a whole, reiterating the illegality of settlement 
activity in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Palestinian PD in the post-ICJ 
ruling will be examined in Chapter 3. In a nutshell, International Law should be 
emphasized, especially in the post-September 11 arena, in order to maximize a positive 
outcome to the Palestinian case.115
114  www.icj.org 
115  Jean Allain, "Beyond the Armed Struggle, The Relationship of International Law and 
International Organizations to the Palestinian Cause", Ibrahim Ab-Lughod Institute of International 
Studies, Birzeit University, 2005
67
Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
2.2.3. Democracy 
Palestine's Democracy track record has been in the spotlight throughout the last few 
years. Assuming that the two major pillars of democracy are elections and a multi-party 
system, Palestine has witnessed a significant progress in that regard despite the external 
obstacles, particularly the occupation, which clearly undermine the democratic process. 
Although some scholars argue that Palestinian democracy is evident in theory but it is 
not 
fully manifested in practice116, the Israeli occupation remains the most prominent 
obstacle to the development of democracy in Palestine. In fact, democracy regresses in 
the absence of economic and social and human rights, all of which are a result of Israel's 
continuing occupation and domination of Palestinian life, economy and territory. 
Palestine has been widely admired for its progress in moving towards the direction of 
becoming a substantive democracy. In fact, the will of the people reflects a genuine 
desire for democracy; this was translated in the January 2004 presidential elections. In 
this regard, Palestine has enhanced its attractiveness through the electoral process. The 
2004 elections were a major step forward, especially that they witnessed widespread 
participation (71%117 of registered voters casting ballots), and were declared free and 
fair by local and international monitors. It is important to highlight such a Palestinian 
116  Nathan Brown, "Evaluating Palestinian Reform", Carnegie Papers Middle East Series. Democracy 
& Rule of Law Project No. 59 (June 2005)
117  Central Elections Commission 
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achievement which symbolizes the Palestinian struggle for freedom not only from the 
Israeli occupation but also for freedom at the internal political dimension. This was 
eloquently expressed by journalist Bakr Abu Bakr in the Palestinian daily "Al Hayat Al-
Jadidah": 
"It is important… to point out what these elections represent[ed] to a 
Palestinian people still struggling to be free, still fighting Israeli occupation, 
and exercising democracy… They represent[ed]: first, an assertion of a course 
and a way of life chosen by the Palestinian people exemplified by freedom, 
dignity, dialogue, responsibility, and respect for the will of the people; second, 
the will and aspiration of many popular leaderships to serve the people…; 
third, a demonstration of Palestinian solidarity…; fourth, the continuity of 
Palestinian political struggle towards common goals; fifth, a renewal of 
societal leaderships."118 
Then came the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections (25 January 2006) in 
which Palestinians have demonstrated an interest and commitment in democracy. The 
fair conduct of these elections has reflected the "commitment of Palestinians to the 
democratic elections and citizen participation in public affairs."119
118  Bakr Abu Bakr Commentary, "Al Hayat Al-Jadidah", 13 May 2005 
119  "Preliminary Statement of the NDI/Carter Center International Observer Delegation To The PLC 
Elections", Jerusalem, 26 January 2006 
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  Clearly then, the elections represented not only a simple democratic procedure; but 
they were also a concrete reflection of democratic ideals and principles, strongly 
advocated by the Palestinian society – all these principles and values of freedom, 
political pluralism, which are also a form of Palestinian unity, should be 
overemphasized when talking about the Palestine case. On the other hand, the existence 
of political parties pave the way for free and fair elections. Although the Palestinian 
political structure is today characterized by Bipolarity (with the dominant Hamas and 
Fateh parties), there are small parties struggling to remain actively present in the 
Palestinian scene. This situation lays the foundation for a multi-party structure in 
Palestine.  
2.2.4. A vibrant civil society (the role of Non Governmental Organizations) 
With the boosting in the number of NGOs around the world from 6000 to 26000 in the 
1990ies alone, governments must now share the international stage with non state actors 
who can use their soft power and mobilize the public.120 NGOs are effective in 
“penetrating states without regard to border. Because they often involve citizens who 
are well placed in the domestic politics of several countries, such networks are able to 
focus the attention of the media and governments on their issues."121   
120   Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004 
Public Affairs New York
121  ibid 
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It is not a coincidence that Palestinian NGOs are among the visible and most vibrant in 
the Arab world.122 Since the outset of the First Intifada, NGOs have had the status of 
ministries and were closely attached to the Palestinian grass-root community. 
The NGO sector in Palestine went through three main stages:
Pre-Oslo: NGOs acted as a shadow government in the absence of a Palestinian 
authority and governmental institutions. In fact, most services within health, 
agriculture, education and human rights were taken care of by a strong and well 
funded NGO sector. Some scholars argue that the the Palestinian Authority has been 
formed in the midst of a highly competent NGO sector that historically took on the 
role a service provider in the absence of a central authority.123 Some of the NGOs had 
the status of ministries and were closely connected to the local Palestinian 
community; this was the case for example with the "popular committees" whose 
purpose was not only "…to carry forward the Intifada but also to assume 
responsibility for a wide range of social 
122 Reema Hamami, "Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo: From NGO Politics to Social Movements?, Middle 
East Report, no 214"
123  Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, "The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, Donors, 
International Organizations and Local NGOs", Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Muwatin, the 
Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, Jerusalem, 2005
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services… such as the provision of health and hygiene-related services and the 
establishment of educational programs after schools were closed by Israeli 
authorities."124
- during Oslo: a number of scholars held that fierce competition erupted 
between the PNA and the NGOs with the arrival of the PNA. The latest had an interest 
in curbing the decades of influence of NGOs, especially that many were critical of the 
Oslo agreements. 
"They [Palestinian  NGOs] saw the  PNA as  an  emerging  state  that  could 
threaten their autonomy, and that of civil society. This was the outlook that 
urged a group of NGOs to form their own network."125
A tense relationship hence developed between the two parties; however, some 
cooperation has been achieved, especially in the sectoral policy formulations. At this 
period, most but not all NGOs had different functions in three varied areas: 
   because of overlap and competition with the newly 
established Palestinian Authority, they played a political 
role and acted as a quasi-opposition to the PNA; some 
124  "Encyclopedia of the Palestinians", Edited by Philip Mattar, Facts On File, Inc., NY, 2000 
125  Jamil Hilal, NGOs and State in Palestine: Negotiating Boundaries
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NGOs monitored the human rights violations of the newly 
established PNA;126 
  they focused on lobbying and advocacy with the aim to 
influence national policies and formulate strategies leading 
to genuine development; 127
  they transformed their agenda from national liberation 
or steadfastness (sumud) to empowerment and 
development. 
- during Al Aqsa Intifada: with the Camp David negotiations’ failure 
leading to the eruption of the intifada, NGOs took this opportunity to show that the 
PNA is unable to live up to people’s expectations, but they have transitioned their role 
to monitoring the situation on the ground, providing regular reports that reveal Israeli 
violations and continuous aggressive attacks against the Palestinians. The GIPP 
(Grassroot International Protection of the Palestinian People) have organized a number 
of solidarity activities with the Palestinian people (visit: 
http://www.pngo.net/GIPP/index.htm); the Palestine Monitor 
(www.palestinemonitor.org) has been an excellent source of information for media 
126   Rema Hammami,  Jamil Hilal,  & Salim Tamari, " Civil Society and Governance in Palestine", 
Palestine Paper, Capetown Meeting, January 1999
127  ibid
73
Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
outlets, international correspondents based locally as well as international political 
policy makers. The Palestine Monitor is an advocacy project started at the outbreak of 
the Al Aqsa Intifada, meant to specifically address the foreign audience in the best 
manner possible.  The major objective of NGOs is to renew links with the Palestinians 
locally and abroad, as well as cooperate with international solidarity movements. 
However, this is not enough, claim Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar:
"While Palestinian NGOs have undertaken very successful forms of 
professional action, such as providing medical services and issuing reliable 
reports on Palestinian casualties and damage caused by Israeli military 
operations, and other human rights violations, they have not developed a 
synergy with the political forces (whether the political parties, Islamic and 
National Committee for the Intifada or unions) or with the population."128
In other words, although Palestinian NGOs have gained international recognition and 
credibility especially in the field of advocacy, they have not been able to harmonize 
the population's energies and marshal them to realize Palestinian political aspirations. 
 The main catalyst for a new NGO role came after the Israeli decision to build a Wall 
inside the Palestinian territory in 2002. The Wall was erected inside the Palestinian 
128  Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, "The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, Donors, 
International Organizations and Local NGOs", Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Muwatin, the 
Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, Jerusalem, 2005
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occupied territory, confiscating hundreds of thousands of dunams129 of Palestinian land, 
including fertile land. The process started in the North of the West Bank, in Qalqilya, 
which is now an open air prison, as the Gaza Strip which has been for more than a 
decade surrounded by the wall on three sides.130 Despite intensive international criticism 
and the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the matter in July 2004, the 
Sharon government continued the construction of the Wall with the pretext of “terror 
campaigns” launched by Palestinian resistance groups. These developments led to the 
awakening of NGOs who became more important actors than the years of PNA-Israel 
negotiations (1991-2000).  NGOs shifted their work from developmental projects to 
immediate needs, especially humanitarian (how to manage the new crisis) and 
international advocacy campaigns. The latter involved a more direct political 
confrontation with the Israeli occupation army through the international presence. Such 
campaigns have been so far successful in mobilizing local and international resources.131 
The perspective of the overall situation of Palestine today is mainly related to the 
labeling of Palestinians as "terrorist". By "terrorism", it is understood in the West and 
Israel "as an instance of political violence directed at civilians with a calculated 
intention of producing fear as well as physical harm."132 The problem here is that 
terrorism has only been associated with non state actors, ignoring the fact that states can 
also engage in terrorism. 
129 "Israel's Wall", Special Edition, First Anniversary of the ICJ's ruling on Israel's Wall, Negotiations 
Affairs Department, PLO, July 9th, 2005 
130  www.pengon.org 
131  see for example: www.palsolidarity.org ; www.ifamericansknew.org
132  Richard Falk, "Azmi Bishara, the Right of Resistance, and the Palestinian Ordeal", Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Winter 2002, Volume XXXI, No. 2, Issue 122
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2.3. Camp David II
2.3.1. What happened at Camp David II:
In July 2000, US President Clinton invited Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat 
to Camp David to conclude negotiations on the long-overdue final status agreement. 
Barak proclaimed his "red lines": Israel would not return to its pre-1967 borders; East 
Jerusalem with its 175,000 Jewish settlers would remain under Israeli sovereignty; 
Israel would annex settlement blocs in the West Bank containing some 80 percent of the 
180,000 Jewish settlers; and Israel would accept no legal or moral responsibility for the 
creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. The Palestinians, in accord with UN 
Security Council resolution 242 and their understanding of the spirit of the Oslo 
Declaration of Principles, sought Israeli withdrawal from the vast majority of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem, and recognition of an independent 
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state in those territories.133 But Barak was very clear from the beginning: there is no 
return to the 1967 borders.134
The US-sponsored summit convened. It suggested the division of Palestinian territory 
into four separate cantons entirely surrounded and controlled by Israel. Israel sought to 
annex 10% of the Occupied Palestinian Territory in exchange for only 1% of Israel’s 
own territory. The proposal denied Palestinians control over their own borders, airspace 
and water resources while legitimizing and expanding illegal Israeli colonies in 
Palestinian territory. Israel also proposed that Palestinians be required to give up any 
claim to the occupied portion of Jerusalem, forcing the recognition of Israel’s 
annexation of Arab-inhabited east Jerusalem135. However, further talks suggested that 
Israel allow Palestinians sovereignty over isolated Palestinian neighborhoods but still 
remain surrounded by illegal Israeli colonies. The Camp David Summit ended without 
reaching an agreement, mainly because of the Jerusalem issue. Although Barak offered 
a far more extensive Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank than any other Israeli leader 
had publicly considered, he insisted on maintaining Israeli sovereignty over East 
Jerusalem. This was unacceptable to the Palestinians and to most of the Muslim world. 
Arafat left Camp David with enhanced stature among his constituents because he did 
not yield to American and Israeli pressure. Barak returned home to face political crisis 
within his own government, including the abandonment of coalition partners who felt 
he had offered the Palestinians too much. A virulent Israeli campaign delegitimizing 
133  http://www.gush-shalom.org/generous/generous.html
134  Nasser Aruri, "Dishonest Broker: The U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine", Cambridge South End 
Press, 2003
135  Clayton E. Swisher, "The Truth about Camp David" the Untold Story about the Collapse of the 
Middle East Peace Process, Nation Books New York, 2004
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Arafat has started. On the other hand, although all parties had agreed that in the 
concluding communiqué about the summit conference, no blame will be put on any 
party, in case no agreement is reached, US President Bill Clinton has put his finger-
pointing on the Palestinians for the failure of the summit by explicitly accusing them of 
not moving forward.136 
2.3.2. Israeli Myth of a "missed generous offer" Vs. Palestinian reactions 
to the myth
The fact that there were no official documents at Camp David II paved the way for 
positions to be conveyed either orally or in written articles, as the personal accounts 
delivered by Malley and Agha.137 
The Israeli position, or rather propaganda machine, was at its best in promptly 
conveying a message of blame and attack against the Palestinian leader. Upon the 
conclusion of the summit (on 25 July 2000), Barak made the following statement at a 
Press Conference: 
"All my life I fought for Israeli security, and I reiterate: I will not agree to relinquish 
the vital interests of Israeli security; I will not agree to give up the strengthening of 
Israel and the bolstering of greater Jerusalem, with a solid Jewish majority, for 
future generations…Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions necessary at 
136  Helga Baumgarten, "The Myth of Camp David Or The Distortion of the Palestinian Narrative", Abu 
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this time in order to bring about an end to the conflict. Arafat's positions on 
Jerusalem are those which prevented the achievement of the agreement……Arafat 
somehow hesitated to take the historic decisions that were needed in order to put an 
end of it…It's painful to realize that the other side is not ripe for peace…"138  
It is interesting to note that Israel's myth started to crystallize well before the summit 
ended. Barak reiterated the slogan "We turned every stone, we exhausted every 
possibility to bring an end to the conflict…"139 During the summit, Barak brought with 
him "encrypted communications equipment that, when it worked, allowed him to talk 
securely with his PR team in Israel, including Moshe Gaon and Tal Zilberstein…"140 
From its side, the Palestinian delegation, with far less media sophistication and 
resources, did not make one single relevant declaration. The only unsubstantial 
statement made by Arafat, upon his return to Gaza, was very symbolic, referring to 
the day of independence with Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine and the usual 
challenging note of "…who does not like it might just as well drink the waters of the 
Dead Sea."141 The biggest mistake by Palestinians was their use of the traditional 
diplomacy (secret diplomacy: Arafat's visits to world leaders to explain the Palestinian 
position), while completely ignoring PD and the use of international media outlets. 
The Israeli myths and the blame game, with new ideas (such as "there is no 
138http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/  
139  Helga Baumgarten, "The Myth of Camp David Or The Distortion of the Palestinian Narrative", Abu 
Lughod Institute, Birzeit University, 2004
140  Clayton E. Swisher, "The Truth about Camp David" the Untold Story about the Collapse of the 
Middle East Peace Process, Nation Books New York, 2004
141  Helga Baumgarten, "The Myth of Camp David Or The Distortion of the Palestinian Narrative", 
Abu Lughod Institute, Birzeit University, 2004 
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Palestinian partner"…), not only continued but also started to be echoed by Western 
media outlets. 
2.4. Al Aqsa Intifada 
As a reaction to the continuing and deepening occupation of the Palestinian land, 
another Intifada erupted. In September 28, 2000, the second Intifada, known as the Al-
Aqsa Intifada, begins after Sharon’s incursion into the Al-Aqsa mosque. Sharon states 
that Israel controls the area and will never give it to the Palestinians because it is built 
over a Jewish holy site. Within the days that followed, Israeli Occupation Forces 
stormed the Al-Aqsa compound and opened fire on worshippers, killing seven 
Palestinians and wounding 220142. As the news spread, mass demonstrations in all parts 
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip erupted. It should have been clearly articulated by 
the Palestinian officials that the Intifada was a response to injustice. For seven years, the 
Palestinians waited for Oslo to produce results; however, while Israel was building 
settlements, which doubled during this period of a supposed "peace", Palestinians 
almost did not perform any act of violence against Israeli military depredations. The 
uprising came as a direct outcome of the Israeli policy. The deeply flawed "peace 
process" initiated at Oslo, combined with the daily frustrations and humiliations 
142  www.palestinemonitor.org 
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inflicted upon Palestinians in the occupied territory, converged to ignite the furor of the 
population. 
The military path of Palestinian resistance turned out to be the worst options. " "Suicide 
bombings are totally immoral and serve no strategic goal, but have been totally 
successful in feeding into the political plans of maniac military professionals like Ariel 
Sharon and Shimon Peres".143.In fact, such attacks have only increased the Israeli 
propaganda and portrayal of Palestinian innocents as being the terrorist and rapist and 
the Israeli rapist as an innocent in dire need of security. Also, Militarizing the intifada 
has harmed the PD/image of the Palestinians for the following reasons:  
1. Using weapons has allowed Israel to use excessive force, therefore 
killing and injuring a large number of Palestinian innocent civilians, without 
serious media coverage or international condemnatory reactions; 
2. Because of the woeful lack of honest coverage, the daily confrontations 
were exposed on international media outlets as fights between two "equal" 
armies – it should be made clear to any type of audience that the Palestinian 
case is not a negotiation dispute, nor is it a case of a dispute between two 
parties that can be described as equal parties; this is a struggle for self-
determination;
143  Sam Bahour & Michael Dahan, "A Way out", April 2002, www.amin.org 
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3. To save its image, the Israeli powerful and effective media machine 
introduced new terminology to the situation, ranging from "terrorists" to 
"disputed territory" or even "infrastructure of terror", while Palestinians have 
no coined terminology ;
4. While the world was busy with the daily headlines about Palestinian 
"terrorists" attacking Israeli "citizens", and with a very poor Palestinian media 
pro-active machine and confusing spokespersons, with divergent and 
sometimes contradictory statements, Israel succeeded in  forcing change on the 
ground (settlements, wall, prisoners, assassinations…);  
5.  Then, unexpected events negatively impacted the Intifada: those of 11 
September 2001. This terrorist act, when hijacked planes slammed into the 
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, was a 
present for Sharon, who used it to cover the war crimes Israel was committing 
in its occupation of the Palestinian territory, disguising these under the banner 
of the "war against terrorism".  Such events required that Palestinians evaluate 
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their past struggle and come up with realistic means to secure their future 
state.144 
On a different angle, some bilateral 'diplomatic' initiatives have also tarnished the 
Palestinian PD and cause: the Geneva Agreement, between some 'peace camps' 
from both sides (Palestinian and Israeli), was signed during a peak period of 
bloodshed, in stark contrast to the developments on the ground in Palestine.145 
Such an event was publicized all over the globe and was exposed as a model for 
peace in the region. However, this has created a disconnection and a distortion 
from the ongoing reality in Palestine, concealing Israel's occupation and daily use 
of state terror against the Palestinian population. 
2.5. How can the Palestinian PD be improved? 
It is now clear that many mistakes could have been avoided if there was a Palestinian 
operational PD machine. How can we generate unprecedented support for the 
Palestinian cause? As we have noted, Palestinian PD can be said to be lacking essential 
means to succeed. As it has also been agreed upon, a state must work through 
144   Jean Allain, "Beyond the Armed Struggle, The Relationship of International Law and 
International Organizations to the Palestinian Cause", Ibrahim Ab-Lughod Institute of International 
Studies, Birzeit University, 2005
145  Samir Awad, Review of  "New Game or New Narratives?", "The Path to Geneva: the Quest for a 
Permanent Agreement" by Yossi Beilin, and "The Geneva Accord: Plan or Pretense?" by Nick 
Kardahji, Journal of Palestine Studies, University of California Press, Volume XXXIV, No. 3, Spring 
2005
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organizations and networks with and separate from government in order to make its 
voice heard and to influence events outside its direct control.
As cunningly put by Ambassador Afif Safieh, 
"… we, Palestinians, have never put our house in order and we have a sort of 
dynamic approach to the American society. I believe that we should address 
not only American decision-making but also American public opinion, and we 
should have an institution, not necessarily within the Authority, with a pool of 
15 or so speakers who spend their time moving between every single state in 
the US. We should have here in Palestine think tanks that decide upon the best 
Palestinian diplomatic doctrine and how we should package our message, 
because here again we were not always maestros in the communication of our 
ideas and aspirations… There is no doubt whatsoever; for as long as we do not 
do our homework, we are destined to remain failures." 146 
The Palestinian homework mainly implies, inter alia, initiating change through the 
development of a creative foreign policy. For example, from the beginning, i.e. before 
reaching independence, the Palestinian Authority should build in its structure 
demilitarization:
146  www.passia.org 
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"… like Costa Rica, it can adopt a constitution which will prohibit the 
establishment of an army. A step of this sort would in the most fundamental 
way define Palestine as a peace-loving state." 147
In order to achieve its objective of increasing its popularity abroad (for its national 
interest), the Palestinian leadership should work on two fronts: on a theoretical level and 
a practical one.
2.5.1. Theoretical Level
Palestinian PD requires a new thinking (political will) and decision making structures – 
none of these still exist. By new thinking is meant that the image problem and the 
foreign policy are not apart but do form an integrated whole. PD is a strategic 
instrument and a central element of the Foreign Policy of Palestine; and it is in the 
national interest of Palestinians to formulate and manage their foreign policy in a 
rightful manner. This entails a deeper understanding of foreign attitudes and a more 
effective communications apparatus of Palestinian policies, as well as a serious 
governmental engagement to foster increasingly meaningful relations with foreign 
journalists. Another theoretical factor which should be given priority is a strong 
147  Jerome M. Segal, "A Foreign Policy for the State of Palestine", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 
18, No. 2, Winter 1989 
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decision-making structure; i.e. developing immediately a coherent strategic 
coordinating framework, including a Presidential directive on PD. Finally, as a vital 
instrument of national policy, a successful Palestinian PD should include a central role 
for non state actors148 through a strong coordination mechanism among the Palestinian 
National Authority, Civil Society, Private Sector and Diaspora. Only through the 
building of an internal consensus can a Palestinian strategy be fruitful.149 
2.5.2. Practical Level  
Based on what has been said, how can PD machinery function properly? The current 
governmental apparatus, as it is constituted, is not able to undertake the implementation 
of an effective strategy. It is not organizationally set up for such a task and, if it is to do 
so, will need an extensive overhaul.
A suggested organizational structure requires the creation of new departments within 
the PNA structure. Logically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would implement the PD 
program, led by the central player, i.e. the President, his key advisers and the Foreign 
Affairs Minister (See Figure 1.1.). 
148  William A. Rugh, "Engaging the Arab & Islamic Worlds through Public Diplomacy", Public 
Diplomacy Council, 2004 
149 Jean Allain, "Beyond the Armed Struggle, The Relationship of International Law and International 




Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
The following is a suggested draft organizational structure: 
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Figure 2.1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Diplomacy Department 
The PD Director would have two essential tasks: to follow up on the internal 
Media, Training and Political strategy programs and to report to the PD state central 
player (the President, his key advisers, and the Foreign Affairs Minister). By "Political 
Strategy" and "Media" is meant the formation of think tanks in these fields. These think 
tanks have the role to design, recommend and improve the policy and decision making 
through scientific researches and analysis.150 Through local and international networks, 
this Department can operate efficiently and without high financial costs, if the Diaspora 
Palestinians and friends are harnessed to the Palestinian interest.151
Also, with the tremendous advances in communications technology in recent years, the 
above organization is easy and not costly in terms of implementation.  PD activities 
should be essentially carried out through websites, CD-Roms, emails, teleconference 
programs, and other marvels of the late XXI Century revolution. 
2.5.3. The role of the media
150  see for example the work of RAND on www.rand.org 
151  Jean Allain, "Beyond the Armed Struggle, The Relationship of International Law and 
International Organizations to the Palestinian Cause", Ibrahim Ab-Lughod Institute of International 
Studies, Birzeit University, 2005
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Interrelated revolutionary changes in politics, international relations, and mass 
communication have greatly expanded the media's role in diplomacy. The revolution in 
communication technologies, the capability to broadcast, often live, almost every 
significant development in world events to almost every place on the globe, has led to 
the globalization of electronic journalism and to substantial growth of networks, 
stations, and communication consumers worldwide.152 Consequently, a nation's or a 
leader's image is easily and promptly conveyed worldwide.  While communications 
technology is becoming more widespread, the lack of research on media and diplomacy 
and the lack of analytical tools and models have inhibited progress in the field; in fact, 
Palestinians have not yet embarked on an aggressive and well-financed Media Strategy 
to challenge the fierce battle led by the Israeli media. What were the faults in the 
Palestinian media performance throughout the latest years, and how to redeem them? In 
September 2005, a conference by the Palestinian Ministry of Information was convened 
on "an Information Strategy for promoting the Palestinian cause in the West". 
Conferees made strong self-criticism about the fact that the media attempts to present 
the Palestinian struggle as that of a Palestinian mother appearing to celebrate the death 
of her son and refusing to show her real feelings or a militant exhibiting a child carrying 
a weapon or a masked 16 years old parading with a Kalashnikov. The need to humanize 
the Palestinian image through encouraging human interest stories and documentaries 
was emphasized repeatedly.
152  Hamid Mowlana, "Global Information and World Communication : New Frontiers in 
International Relations", SAGE Publications, 1997 
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The following is a summary distributed at the end of the Conference on the failings of 
Palestinians in delivering their case professionally and convincingly. The results 
concentrated particularly on the failure of the Palestinian "messenger":
1. Speaking with one voice. The message coming from Palestinians is 
not unified. Depending on whom one speaks to, it often happens that the 
view differs. There must be a prior agreement about what is the official line 
on any matter.
2. Language and terminology. Too many Palestinians do not speak 
foreign languages with sufficient proficiency. This is of great importance, 
since Israelis are skilled at presenting their case fluently and articulately in 
Western languages. The result is that they seem to win the argument each 
time. There is also an issue of terminology. Israeli use of certain terms has 
distorted the picture and influenced the West’s terminology. Examples are: 
‘ceasefire’- more suitable to two equal armies than the reality of occupied 
and occupier; ‘disputed territory’, meaning occupied land; ‘terrorism’, 
meaning legitimate resistance, ‘security fence’, meaning Apartheid wall, 
'infrastructure of terror' meaning clinics, charity organizations, and 
kindergartens, and so on.
3. Cultural affinity. It is important to address the West, decision 
makers, the public and the media, in a cultural language they can understand. 
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Palestinians often do not know this culture and speak in a way, which is 
unappealing, and therefore can easily be dismissed or misunderstood. For 
example, understating the case is more usual in the West than overstating it 
or using strong language. 
4. Physical appearance. People are influenced by physical appearance. 
A man or woman who is badly dressed or badly groomed does not impress as 
much as someone who looks nice. Gender is also important to a Western 
audience. More women should be spokespeople, as this conveys an 
impression of sexual equality and respect for women which are important in 
the West.
5. Presentation skills. It is not everyone who can speak on TV or radio 
without any training. This applies equally to ministers, high officials and 
others. Again, looking at the Israeli parallel, it is striking that when Israelis 
speak they have a technique and a way of answering questions, which makes 
the point and uses the time of the interview efficiently. Palestinian officials 
should avoid undertaking interviews if they have had no training.
6. Understanding Israel. This concern the "research center" in the 
organizational structure suggested for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Understanding how Israelis address the West and how they operate there is 
essential.  The debate in the West is between the Israeli and Palestinian 
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versions of events. It is often the case that Palestinians appear not to 
understand their Israeli protagonists and so lose the argument, even though 
they are in the right track.
7. Being proactive. Israel has a long history of abuse against the 
Palestinians. The latter should be prepared for the next assault, without 
waiting for it to happen. This means that for too long, the Palestinian pattern 
has been to react to the event, rather than anticipate it and put their case first. 
Probably the best example of this failure is the Camp David talks in 2000, 
when the Israeli side was allowed to put across its version without official 
contradiction. The result has been that there is a solid conviction in the West 
about Ehud Barak’s ‘generous offer’ which the Palestinians rejected. When 
the Palestinian accounts of what happened were published, it was too late.
8. Using facts rather than opinion. Scrupulous attention to the facts 
when presenting the case is crucial, because the Israeli technique is always to 
distort and misinform. Palestinians often do not present the facts, but just 
refute the Israeli arguments with opinion. This calls for attention to detail 
and substance on the part of Palestinian spokespeople.
9. Avoiding the myth of equivalence. Palestinians promote the idea 
that they are a state or an entity which is somehow equivalent to Israel. This 
is not deliberate, but it becomes inevitable when using terms of state 
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structure and military forces. It has allowed the West to excuse Israel’s many 
excesses on account of this misconception. It is important for Palestinians to 
project the idea of a people under occupation without capacity to resist an 
army and a state policy directed against them.
While focus was mainly put on enhancing the skills of messengers, it is also 
important to re-activate and organize the roles of various NGOs (dealing in advocacy 
and media) and PNA bodies (such as the Negotiations Support Unit, Monitoring Group, 
etc…) and decide on issuing daily information letter about the Israeli violations in the 
Palestinian Territory. The information would comprise data about all forms of 
violations, ranging from settlements activities, to assassinations, killing of civilians, 
collective punishment, home demolitions, ethnic cleansing, inter alia. A daily paper of 
talking points could go far in reflecting the Palestinian public position. This paper 
would be electronically sent to all types of audiences locally and internationally. In 
order to achieve this, again, it is fundamental to create and consolidate a strong 
coordination among the PNA, the Private Sector and the NGO sector. 
It is true that Palestine is a just cause; however, the performance of some of its 
defenders was not up to the task. But an attempt to change that could lead to 
significantly fruitful results is still possible. The great unprecedented success achieved 
at The Hague is clear evidence. The key will be in the implementation, follow up and 
the seriousness of the Palestinian leadership in pursuing such endeavor.
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Chapter 3 - Palestinian Public Diplomacy in the post-ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
the illegality of the Wall
3.1. Introduction 
On the 9th of July 2004, the World Court declares Israel’s Annexation Wall illegal. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling states that the “construction of the 
wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are 
contrary to international law … [and] Israel is under an obligation to terminate its 
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breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works 
of construction of the wall.”
If PD is "informing, engaging, and influencing foreign publics in support of a 
country's national interests"153, then Palestinians have achieved unprecedented and 
definitive PD victory through the ICJ ruling on the Wall. Such success is certainly 
no panacea if not followed by Palestinian national operational measures through 
efficient PD tools to ensure putative advantage to the Palestinian cause. Before 
addressing the PD instruments to be used to advance the Palestinian case after the 
ICJ ruling, the chapter opens with an explanation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion. The 
next sections will tackle the success and failings in the Palestinian PD regarding the 
development of the ruling. Finally, some recommendations will be suggested, based 
on other countries' proven best practices fostering strong dynamic underpinnings for 
international support for Palestine. 
3.2. What is the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall? 
3.2.1. General Information on the ICJ and the Advisory Opinion 
With the dissolution of the League of Nations, the ICJ was created at the San 
Francisco Conference in spring 1945, with the participation of 50 States. The ICJ 
was established with a view to helping the UN in "bringing about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
153  William A. Rugh, "Engaging the Arab & Islamic Worlds through Public Diplomacy", Public 
Diplomacy Council, 2004 
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adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations."154 The ICJ is the 
principal judicial organ of the UN Charter. Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The 
Hague (Netherlands). It started to be operational in 1946, when it replaced the 
Permanent Court of International Justice which had functioned in the Peace Palace 
since 1922. 
The ICJ has two functions: to settle in accordance with international law the legal 
disputes submitted to it by States, and to give advisory opinions on legal questions 
referred to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies.155 
As stipulated in Article 96.1 of the Court's Statute, "the General Assembly or the 
Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory 
opinion on any legal question."156 On the same angle, Article 96.2 of the UN Charter 
states that the General Assembly could authorize "other organs of the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies" to require advisory opinions on "legal 
questions arising within the scope of their activities."157  Article 65 also indicates 
154  UN Charter X.1. 
155  "Advisory Opinion Proceedings on Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory", ICJ, Written Statement (30 January 2004) And Oral Pleading (23 
February 2004) , see also http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
156  ibid 
157 the organizations in question are: International Labour Organisation (ILO) ; Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO); Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); World Health Organization 
(WHO); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); International Finance 
Corporation (IFC); International Development Association (IDA); International Monetary Fund 
(IMF); International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU); World Meteorological Organization (WMO); International Maritime Organization (IMO); 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD); United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). ECOSOC requested an advisory opinion of the Court in two cases: 
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations and Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of 
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that the advisory function of the Court is discretionary.158 As Kelsen puts it "the 
Court may, for reasons completely within its discretion, refuse to give an advisory 
opinion requested in conformity with the Charter."159 According to Articles 59 of the 
Court's Statute and 94 of the UN Charter, the ICJ considers its advisory functions as 
a means for international organizations to obtain an opinion without any binding 
force, contrary to the judgments. However, even if not binding, advisory opinions 
are considered more than a simple advice.160 In fact, such opinions have a certain 
moral authority since their contents are in accordance with international law.161 
Lessons can be learned from the Namibian case. There are analogies between the 
Wall case and the Namibian case before the ICJ in 1971, which eventually resulted 
in Namibian statehood. It is interesting to note that the wording in the Namibian ICJ 
Opinion is very similar in the Wall Opinion, in that it found that the presence of 
South Africa in Namibia was illegal; that South Africa was under obligation to put 
an end to its occupation of Namibia; and that UN member states had the duty to 
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and had to refrain 
the Commission on Human Rights
158  Claude Barrat, "The International Court of Justice and its Advisory Opinion on the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2004
159  Kelsen, "The Law of the United Nations", quoted in Claude Barrat, "The International Court of 
Justice and its Advisory Opinion on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory", Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 2004
160  Claude Barrat, "The International Court of Justice and its Advisory Opinion on the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2004
161  ibid 
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from any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the 
illegality of, or lending support or assistance to, its presence in Namibia.162 
3.2.2. The Wall 
On the 16th of June 2002, the Israeli government officially launched the erection of 
a Wall between the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel, not on the green line 
(the internationally recognized border that existed between Israel and the West Bank 
until the war of 1967), but deep eastward, with tens of thousands of dunams of 
Palestinian land expropriated by Israel. The wall consists of an entire regime, with 
concrete slabs towering 8 meters high (25 feet), razor wire, trenches, sniper towers, 
electrified fences, military roads, electronic surveillance, remote-controlled infantry, 
and "buffer zones" that stretch hundreds meters wide.163 With the construction of this 
wall, Israel has instituted several administrative measures designed to deny 
Palestinians access to their lands and their sole source of living. These measures 
range from land confiscation orders to home demolitions, permits to access their 
lands or even return to their homes, and severe restrictions on movement and trade 
even within the Palestinian cities in the West Bank.164  The February 2005 Anti-
Apartheid Wall campaign map reveals that when and if it is completed, nearly all of 
162  http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/inamsummary710621.htm
163  PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, on www.nad-plo.org 
164  ibid 
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the West Bank population will be affected by the Wall through loss of land, 
imprisonment in ghettos, or isolation in areas de facto annexed to Israel.165  Although 
Israel maintains that the Wall is a temporary structure needed to physically separate 
the West Bank from Israel and thus prevent suicide attacks on Israeli citizens, the 
wall’s location (in some places extending up to 20 km inside Palestinian territory) 
and projected length (currently 750 km despite a border with Israel of less than 
200km), however, suggest it is actually an additional effort to confiscate Palestinian 
land, facilitate further expansion of illegal settlements, and unilaterally redraw 
geopolitical borders while encouraging an exodus of Palestinians by denying them 
the ability to earn a living from their land, reach their schools or work places, access 
adequate water resources, and reach essential health care facilities.166 In fact, if the 
wall were truly for security purposes as claimed by Israel, it would have been routed 
on the 1967 pre-occupation line. The expansion of Jewish colonies and their 
infrastructure, coupled with the vast measures of administrative control and 
strangulation, will leave over half of a fragmented West Bank, without East 
Jerusalem for a future Palestinian state.167 The demographic and geopolitical changes 
that the wall and settlement expansion impose will foreclose the possibility of 
achieving a two-state solution, and hence, peace. Israel has a dual goal in building 
the wall: to confiscate and de facto annex Palestinian lands and water resources 
necessary for a viable Palestinian state, especially in and around East Jerusalem; and 
to encourage a tacit exodus of Palestinians by denying them the ability to earn a 
165  Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign Poster Map, February 2005 
166  www.palestinemonitor.org 
167  www.nad-plo.org 
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living from their lands and by restricting freedom of movement to such an extent 
that remaining in their cities, towns and/or villages becomes an impossible 
alternative.168 
3.2.3. The Advisory Opinion on the Wall 
On the 8th of December 2003, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution asking the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an advisory 
opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s construction of the wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory. The main findings of the Court concerned not only 
the erection of the Wall, but also major issues of the Palestinian Israeli conflict: the 
status of the Palestinian territory, the right to self determination of the Palestinian 
people, the applicability of international human rights law and humanitarian law to 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
On the 9th of July 2004, The ICJ at the Hague found, by a ruling of fourteen votes to 
one, that the construction of the Wall by Israel in the occupied territory, including 
East Jerusalem, is “contrary to international law,” and that Israel is under an 
obligation to cease the Wall’s construction, dismantle the existing structure, and 
make reparations for any damage caused by the construction. Moreover, by a ruling 
of thirteen votes to two, the ICJ found that “all States are under an obligation not to 
168  ibid 
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recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to 
render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction."169
The ruling held that Israel’s construction of the Wall in the West Bank constitutes a 
grave violation of human rights and international law. The construction of the Wall 
within the West Bank, and the annexation of occupied land is prohibited under the 
laws governing actions of occupying powers; the Wall’s construction further 
violates a basic principal of the laws of occupation that legal rights to land cannot be 
acquired by way of military occupation. International law also states that private 
property cannot be confiscated or destroyed. This applies without exception, not 
even for security needs.170 The Wall is another instrument (of numerous Israeli 
military occupation measures, including settlements, checkpoints, etc…) used to 
impose collective punishment on the civilian population and directly violates the 
rights of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians including their rights to 
freedom of movement, right to property, right to health, education, work and their 
basic rights to food and water. The Israeli construction of the Wall and its 
implications for the Palestinian people is in direct violation of the Geneva 
Conventions of which Israel is a contracting party.
3.3. How the Palestinians achieved PD success
169   "Advisory Opinion Proceedings on Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory", ICJ, Written Statement (30 January 2004) And Oral Pleading (23 
February 2004) , see also http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
170  Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign Fact Sheet: The Wall and International Law
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Since 1948, Palestinians have been under the Israeli military authority, enduring the 
violence of occupation, displacement, hunger, humiliation, and now finally (with the 
building of the Wall) ghettoization and imprisonment. Palestinians have suffered 
throughout these decades under the watchful eyes of the international community, 
yet with no apparent recourse to international justice. Throughout these years, Israel 
has portrayed the Palestinians as conspicuously avoiding diplomatic channels of 
protest. 
In 2004, with the ICJ ruling, the Palestinians were able to move their battle on the 
diplomatic and international level. The fact that Israel has launched an immense 
defamation campaign in an attempt to de-legitimize the highest judicial body of the 
United Nations and deny the Palestinians access to any form of official protest is a 
proof that such diplomatic approach is significant and effective. 
The verdict was damaging to Israel's reputation and Public Relations line, based on 
the erroneous claims that the problem is Palestinian terrorism. 
In addition to prompting world attention, Palestinian PD success rests on two major 
factors: the decision itself and the approach used. 
3.3.1. the decision: a strongly worded advisory opinion 
Despite the fact that the US administration and Israel maintained that the erection of 
the Wall should be dealt with through negotiations, the World Court has rejected 
such arguments and ruled the Wall a violation of international law. Besides the blow 
to the Israeli Public Relations, the ruling has been explicit and vigorous. Officially 
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adopting the term "Wall" as opposed to the Israeli claim that it is a "barrier", the ICJ 
demanded that Israel not only ceases its building, but also dismantle parts that have 
already been constructed. In addition to that, Israel is required to compensate 
Palestinians who have suffered from this land grab:
"Israel obliged to put an end to the violation of its international  
obligations  Obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the 
wall, to dismantle it forthwith and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith 
the legislative and regulatory acts relating to its construction, save where 
relevant for compliance by Israel with its obligation to make reparation for 
the damage caused  Israel obliged to make reparation for the damage 
caused to all natural or legal persons affected by construction of the wall."171 
By "reparation", the Court advised that Israel must return all land and trees 
requisitioned and is under an obligation to return to the pre-status quo; i.e. before the 
illegal act took place.  On the same angle, the ruling provides a clear-cut analysis 
and evidence of Israel's motives to establish de facto borders, not for security 
reasons, but for the imposition of de facto annexation of Palestinian land. 
The ruling made it very clear that Israeli actions on the ground (the Wall and its 
"Associated Regime") were affecting a "fait accompli", as an attempt to pre-
determine final status issues by creating unilateral permanent realities. The Court 
also held that the construction of the wall entails substantial restrictions on the 
171  "Advisory Opinion Proceedings on Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory", ICJ, Written Statement (30 January 2004) And Oral Pleading (23 
February 2004) , see also http://www.icj-cij.org/
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freedom of movement of Palestinians. Therefore, the Court found that Israel has 
violated guarantees of freedom of movement under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the Palestinian's right to work, to health, to education 
and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. All such actions, the Court maintained, cannot be justified by security 
measures – the following statement speaks volumes: 
"Applicable provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights  
instruments relevant to the present case  Destruction and requisition of 
properties  Restrictions on freedom of movement of inhabitants of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory  Impediments to the exercise by those 
concerned of the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate 
standard of living  Demographic changes in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory  Provisions of international humanitarian law enabling account  
to be taken of military exigencies  Clauses in human rights instruments 
qualifying rights guaranteed or providing for derogation  Construction of  
the wall and its associated régime cannot be justified by military exigencies  
or by the requirements of national security or public order  Breach by 
Israel of various of its obligations under the applicable provisions of  
international humanitarian law and human rights instruments."172 
172  ibid 
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With these positively staggering facts, the ICJ concluded that the wall is not being 
built for military reasons. Though "security" is the constant and proffered Israeli 
pretext, coveting Palestinian land is the real reason behind the building of the wall. 
To put it in a nutshell, the ruling "is the most significant pronouncement… of the 
legal framework which exists regarding Palestine… since it goes beyond 
considering solely the issue of the construction of the Wall by dealing with 
fundamental issues regarding the continuing Israeli occupation…"173 and it has set a 
precedent in the history of Palestinian diplomacy on two fronts: Israel's furious 
diplomatic activity to sabotage the hearing and claim that the wall issue does not lie 
within the court's jurisdiction has failed; second, not only did the court accept the 
case, but it also branded the wall a political measure and a land grab by Israel. In 
addition to that, the court rightfully acknowledges that Israel is in "belligerent 
occupation" of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and demands that Palestinians be 
compensated for Israel's illegal actions. 
3.3.2. a comprehensive approach 
The approach was comprehensive, ranging from a description of the situation on the 
ground, to the Israeli historical and continuous infringements of international law, to 
demands to the international community to act against such Israeli violations.   
173  Jean Allain, "Beyond the Armed Struggle, The Relationship of International Law and 
International Organizations to the Palestinian Cause", Ibrahim Ab-Lughod Institute of International 
Studies, Birzeit University, 2005
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In fact, the ICJ ruling went further than the international community had expected! 
The Court addressed Israeli actions as a whole, highlighting UN Resolutions (all 
violated by Israel), the illegal settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (including East Jerusalem), and reframing the whole conflict: it is no 
longer between two equal parties who try to settle a disputed territory issue, but it is 
the Israeli military occupation, and Israel is under an obligation to terminate its 
breaches of international law. The statements underlined the fundamental issues of 
the on-going conflict, not only explicitly expressing the illegality of the Israeli 
occupation, but also calling on the international community to recognize its own 
obligations in enforcing international law and protecting human rights in their own 
nations and internationally. The ruling pointed out that the obligations violated by 
Israel included certain obligations erga omnes174; i.e. towards all, in that all States 
are under an obligation to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the 
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and should seek an 
end to any impediments to Palestinian self determination. 
"Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations 
involved, the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation  not  
to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall  
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East  
Jerusalem.  They are also under an obligation not to render aid or  
174   Claude Barrat, "The International Court of Justice and its Advisory Opinion on the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2004
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assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.  It is  
also for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and 
international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the 
construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right  
to self-determination is brought to an end.  In addition, all the States parties  
to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while respecting the 
United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by 
Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that  
Convention."175 
The ruling went far to call on the United Nations to consider measures against Israel. 
It concluded with: 
"…the Court is of the view that the United Nations, and especially the  
General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further 
action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the 
construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account of the 
present Advisory Opinion."176
In summary, the 9th of July 2004 means legal and diplomatic history for Palestine, 
and a strong salvo in favour of international law. The ICJ states that Israel had three 
175  "Advisory Opinion Proceedings on Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory", ICJ, Written Statement (30 January 2004) And Oral Pleading (23 
February 2004) , see also http://www.icj-cij.org/
176  ibid 
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primary obligations: to stop the illegal construction of the Wall and dismantle the 
already built parts, to undo all legislation and regulatory acts related to its 
constructions, and finally to provide reparation for all the damage caused by its 
construction. On the other hand, the Court ruled that the international community 
had both individual and collective obligations in that regard: it must not recognize 
the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the Wall, it must not provide 
aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by its construction, and the 
United Nations should consider what further action is required to bring an end to the 
illegal situation resulting from its construction. The ruling gives strong legal and 
political impetus to any future efforts to realise the Palestinian right to self-
determination and to end Israel's prolonged occupation of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. However, the Palestinian leadership has failed to continue this 
unprecedented PD victory. What are the reasons? And how forces can be focused to 
gain international mobilisation against the Israeli flouting of international law?
3.4. Failings in the Palestinian PD and the use of the ICJ Advisory Opinion 
Although Israel received a major blow with the ICJ advisory opinion, the 
Palestinians remained passive and have failed to use this decision in their favor. In 
fact, the Palestinians have not embarked on a PD approach which would have 
involved utilizing and promoting their just cause, as clearly stipulated by the World 
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Court. The ruling required that a new coherent strategy be devised by Palestinians; 
instead, the latter only waited for things to come.
First, the reason behind Palestinian non exertion of political leverage with regards to 
the Wall lies in a shattered networking system and a poor organizational structure of 
the Palestinian Authority. Coordination with "organizations and networks that are 
separate from, independent of… the government"177 is essential to have a state's 
voice heard. Despite some individual and civil society initiatives in villages to 
protest in a non violent manner against the Wall, officials from the Palestinian 
Authority have never cooperated with the villagers or participated in protest events. 
Leonard points out to the importance of government-civil society organizations and 
goes far to say that the "government must be more relaxed about deviations from the 
'party line.'"178 Protest events take place on a low scale; media attention is therefore 
meager. Thus, if planned on a larger scale (governmental level), they would have 
broader international attention and swifter reaction. Governmental-civil society 
coalition should be carried out to ensure a successful PD campaign. 
A second important and overlooked aspect of Palestinian PD is the "living links"179; 
i.e. the Palestinian Diaspora community who are an asset, especially with regards to 
the Wall. This community represents an important channel of PD because they 
"undoubtedly help provide the cultural knowledge, political insight and human 
177  Mark Leonard, "Public Diplomacy", Foreign Policy Center, 2002 
178  ibid  
179  ibid 
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intelligence that is necessary for successful foreign policy."180  The presence of 
Palestinians around the world is actually an asset to Palestinian PD; unfortunately 
this asset has been ignored by the Palestinian leadership. In fact, the latter does not 
realize the importance of such community who can facilitate the work of Palestinian 
policy makers. Not only the Palestinian community abroad has the great advantage 
of reducing misapprehensions of the societies they live with, but their presence also 
reduces the cost of Palestinian PD, if the Palestinian Authority cannot afford the 
money to establish PD offices in each embassy. 
It is true that the Palestinian Authority pays lip-service to the spread of global 
communications, the rise of information technology and media, and the development 
of civil society organizations which all have a powerful effect on societies in 
altering the craft of governments. However, this has never been reflected in the 
Palestinian governmental structure and budgeting system: the way resources are 
deployed do not echo the leadership's engagement in such field; furthermore, the 
Palestinian Authority's budget is tied up in buildings and people, leaving little to 
foreign affairs and the media (less than 2%).181
180  ibid 
181  http://www.mof.gov.ps/nbudget-law.asp 
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3.5. Recommendations 
Despite few tangible steps being taken by the Palestinian leadership as witnessed by 
the ICJ ruling, the Palestinian government has not so far committed enough 
resources to a planned and sustainable PD, an element which has become an 
increasingly influential tool of influence on foreign policy. To counter attack Israel's 
powerful propaganda machine, the key challenge is to develop an efficient model of 
Palestinian PD, capable of having a real impact on countries of strategic importance. 
Palestinian resources need to be deployed in a manner that reflects the priority of the 
Palestinian foreign policy. 
On the issue of the wall, Palestinian spokespersons must make it clear that Israel's 
aims behind building the wall are to impose an expansionist status quo, to complete 
the judaization of most of the West Bank, and thus undermine the possibility of the 
creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state. When Sharon's unilateral 
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"Disengagement" from Gaza took place, Palestinian officials hailed the event, while 
knowing that it all came in order to break through from Israel’s escalating 
international isolation and to alleviate the problems facing Israel’s occupation 
policies on account of the wall. Instead of besieging Israel's policies and keeping the 
spotlights focused on the real challenge, the wall and other designs of the Israeli 
occupation, the Palestinian leadership welcomed the disengagement, with little 
reference to these facts. 
On another angle, a powerful internal networking system must be devised 
encompassing the three types of Palestinian institutions, private, public and civil 
society and the Palestinian community abroad. This type of channel would facilitate 
the promotion of a strategy of Palestinian resistance, combined with building strong 
ties with the International community.  Any strategy should be decided in a unified 
manner in order to better serve the national common interests of the Palestinian 
cause. In other words, the focus should be on rationalizing the resistance in a way to 
make it more productive and to maintain the moral integrity of the Palestinians as a 
people who struggle for freedom and independence. 
The following recommendations are based on Leonard's suggestions of PD's three 
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As news management revolves around day-to-day coping with media outlets, 
there should be more consolidated links between Palestinian officials and locally 
based foreign correspondents. Leonard adds that Foreign Ministries should 
appoint "a spokesperson of international stature to major media 
organizations,"182 as viewers get used to one single regular speaker to act as a 
public face. 
An important element of news management is training in how to deal with the 
media and how to develop a way for planning for and thinking about the 
spectrum of PD activities in a fashionable manner to all diplomats and civil 
society representatives; as skill sets are required to carry out PD on a 
professional basis.  Moreover, the most efficient way to counter Israeli and/or 
international propaganda is a daily follow up of world news, a mechanism to act 
against any distortion in the media and a professional way to spread the facts and 
inform the viewers. 
3.5.2. Strategic Thinking and Communication 
As has been noted in Chapter 2, in order to address the "image" problem, there 
must be a PD department at the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see 
182  Mark Leonard, "Public Diplomacy", Foreign Policy Center, 2002 
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2.5.2.). In an effort to promote Palestine abroad, the PD department should come 
up with a slogan, for example "Palestine Freedom Initiative"… under this 
slogan, there needs to be specific themes around which the promotion of 
Palestine would be centered:  non violent resistance (power of the people), 
freedom, multi-cultural society, inter alia… 
Fortunately, technological development has greatly enhanced the ability of PD to 
reach out and engage local, diaspora Palestinians, and internationals on a 
continuous basis. Building on the Canadian example of PD, binders could be 
produced and distributed to all Palestinian missions around the world, with 
speech 
modules, fact sheets, presentations, messages, and other tools that could be 
applied in support of public outreach activities. It is also necessary to develop a 
password protected website where information, video-material and other updates 
about the situation in Palestine (including the Wall) are posted for downloads for 
Palestinian representative missions abroad.
Communications campaigns, advices Leonard, must be proactive and regularly 
sent to missions abroad so that they are promoted in news stories in each 
country.  "No opportunity to present a positive story"183 about one's country 
should be missed. All activities abroad (whether cultural, economic; i.e. in trade 
183  ibid 
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shows, or other) should be grouped under a single brand with a single logo and 
key message. 
3.5.3. Long-term Relationship Building 
PD does not stop at a short or medium term planning to improve the image of 
one's country. It is a sustainable process, aiming at developing long term 
relationships with foreign countries and audiences.  Palestinians should focus 
their forces towards actively building networks of relationships via follow up 
work. For example, the International Solidarity Movement184, created to support, 
protect and engage the Palestinians in non violent resistance, includes thousands 
of volunteers coming mainly from Europe and America. Palestinian 
organizations receiving these volunteers should be actively building lasting 
relationships with them, i.e. building real and virtual networks. 
The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website should be used to build 
virtual networks, through policy discussion groups with solidarity groups abroad 
as well as with Diaspora Palestinians. In fact, involving discussions on foreign 
policy with the Palestinian public should be a shared Palestinian enterprise 
because public consultation initiatives lead to setting up priorities and 
184   http://www.palsolidarity.org/main/about-ism/
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formulating the values that Palestine should stand for internationally. For 
instance, an E-dialogue website could be established, whereby Palestinian 
citizens can download relevant documents and post their opinions and ideas on 
interactive message boards organized by themes.  It is essential to involve 
citizens, civil society organizations, businesses and local municipalities in policy 
formulation, argues Leonard.  Why? Because direct citizen involvement has 
several positive effects: first, citizens feel they have a voice that is heard, second, 
people's capabilities to provide wise guidance in the formulation of an accurate 
foreign policy should not be underestimated, and finally, this type of 
communication of government-citizen gives an image of a sound government 
based on openness and transparency in the making of Palestinian foreign policy 
and reform. 
 
The significance of the ICJ ruling lies on its legal dimensions, but it should be tied 
up with a strong Palestinian PD planning and development. Not only do Palestinians 
need to work on the "branding" of Palestine, but they also must develop prompt 
responses to any unexpected eventualities that reinforce their strategic key messages 
and goals. The Palestinian leadership should ensure that there are clear-cut messages 
designed to be well understood to each target groups and countries. Managing crises 
is another important tool that the Palestinian Authority should work on to avoid 
undermining strategic goals. In order to achieve this, Leonard argues, a government 
must establish what he calls a "diplomatic SWOT team"; i.e. a team that analyzes 
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and highlights the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats that one's 
country has with a foreign country. 
The following table summarizes the idea: 
Palestinian Public Diplomacy in the USA (sample of PD SWOT)
Strengths
Palestinian presence in major cities 
Newly appointed Palestinian 
Ambassador 
Weaknesses
Impact on decision makers slow 
Pro-active media initiatives weak 
Opportunities
Appetite for news in Palestine post 9/11 
rising 
Americans in solidarity with Palestine 
Threats 
Size and diversity of the USA
War on "Terrorism" 
Jewish Lobby omnipotent presence185
185  see Paul Findley's "They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby", 
Library of Congress, 3rd Edition, 2003, and "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy", John J. 
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, Harvard University, March 2006 
117
Muzna Shihabi, Palestinian Public Diplomacy, Birzeit University, MA Thesis, 2006
Conclusion
Palestinian PD needs new thinking and decision making structures that are totally 
absent today. It is in the Palestinian national interest to manage its foreign policy in 
a manner that the Palestine case receives complete cooperation from foreign nations 
in order to reach an independent Palestinian state. In order to achieve an efficient 
Palestinian PD, the following recommendations are suggested: 
- To issue a Presidential directive on PD on the full integration of PD 
into Palestinian foreign policies;
- To develop immediately a coherent strategy and a coordinating 
structure;
- To use internet resources with a view to fostering meaningful 
relationships with the West and foreign journalists186;
- To involve the private sector, civil society organizations and 
Palestinians in the diaspora for their credibility and independent messages;
- To make PD "THE" central work of all diplomats and ambassadors; 
186  "How to Influence the Media? A Manual for Palestinian Policymakers and Media Professionals", 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, July 2005
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- To establish a Training Institute in PD and in key areas of modern 
communication; 
- To create think tanks and research centers that would pave the way 
for deeper understanding of foreign attitudes; 
- To devise effective communication policies; 
- To have politicians, lawyers and scholars visit Namibia and learn 
from their successful experience in the post-ICJ ruling. 
As has already been noted, PD is a multiplayer apparatus that requires extensive and 
deep coordination.  Palestinians are urgently requested to curb the widespread belief 
that they are "terrorists", and to embark on a dynamic and pro-active approach of 
addressing the West.  As has also been mentioned, Palestinian policy making and 
PD are interconnected: if the strategy of suicide attacks (military force), which are 
"…morally repugnant and politically disastrous on all sorts of grounds",187 is used, it 
cannot be compatible with a challenging political position vis-à-vis Israel. Military 
attacks against civilians undermine other resistance alternatives, including PD, and 
international support with Palestine. Military actions also engender a crumbling of 
the Palestinian resistance's moral high ground.
The Palestinian Diaspora (refugees and expatriates) and Non Governmental 
Organizations are genuine partners of the Palestinian leadership and they could play 
187  Edward Said, "Immediate Imperatives", Dec. 2002, Al Ahram Weekly, also on 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/617/op5.htm
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a major PD role. This important part of society has been excluded from active 
participation in the national dialogue and diplomatic initiatives. Expatriates are an 
educated and affluent community, whose close and good connection with the 
international scene could press and advance their cause in a manner the Palestinian 
leadership and NGOs "inside" the Occupied Palestinian Territory cannot. The 
Palestinian leadership is requested to take a more proactive stance in engaging 
Diaspora voices because their activism would strengthen the Palestinian position. 
The leadership must impart a vision, clear principles, red lines and alternative 
scenarios.
The ICJ hearing was a turning point and a positive development in the Palestinian 
political struggle. Here, in particular, PD should not be unused. PD results will have 
a positive long-term significant impact on the Palestinian case, if used accurately. 
This thesis, however, leaves other questions open. As it is being written, an 
unprecedented event took place:  Hamas' victory in the January 2006 Parliamentary 
elections. This event triggers a new question: how can Palestinians devise a PD 
strategy with the emergence of a constitutional crisis between the newly formed 
government and the President? 
Taking the Gramscian stand, the government should be a "national factor" and 
should not function as a party. The government should place itself above the parties 
and operate on behalf of the national interests of the state. Furthermore, "there 
should be a useful and fruitful relation [among statesmen, government officials, 
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leaders of civil society and 'political society] in the expressions and functions." 
Because of the lack of such components, adds Gramsci, "sterile erudition in place of 
political history … the daily newspaper and the scandal sheet instead of books and 
great periodicals. Ordinary everyday fractiousness and personal conflicts instead of 
serious politics"188 will prevail. 
In view of Israel's successful isolationist policy of Palestinians and of high economic 
and political risks today, "serious politics" must replace "everyday fractiousness" in 
Palestine. The formation of a unified leadership and a consensus on a PD stratagem 
should receive a rigorous scrutiny. 
Given its high potential benefits, PD is an essential benchmark in implementing a 
unified Palestinian strategy, with a modus vivendi formula, acceptable to all political 
parties.
188  Antonio Gramsci, "Prison Notebooks", Vol. 2, Columbia University Press, 1975 
121
